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ABSTRACT
PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGE
AND ITS CONTEXTUALIZATION AS ART
Güven încirlioğlu 
Ph.D. in A.D.A.
Supervisor: Asst.Prof.Dr. İhsan Derman 
June, 1996
Throughout its history, the photographic image was mostly accepted as worthy of art 
status when seen within the parameters that apply to the traditional images, for 
example, paintings. The main theme of this study is to lay out the intrinsic characteristics 
o f photography and to find the ways that photographs are contextualized as art, outside 
and independent of these parameters. To achieve this, a considerable part of this 
research is devoted to the issues of representation that relate both traditional art media 
and the technical images like photography to production of artworks. These include 
pictorial techniques like perspective and abstraction as well as other modes of 
representation made possible by photographic technology. Following this, the argument 
focuses on artistic practices that contextualize photographs and utilize their advantages, 
like montage and conceptual art, and further, the similarities of the photographic image 
and common objects used in art context are analyzed. The study concludes with a 
discussion on the status of the artwork in our times, as the photographic image is 
increasingly intertwined with the digital technology, scrutinizing the all important 
parameters o f representation and art.
Keywords: Photography, Visual Arts, Representation
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ÖZET
FOTOGRAF GÖRÜNTÜSÜ VE
SANAT BAĞLAMINDAKİ KULLANIMI
Güven İncirlioğlu
Sanat, Tasarım ve Mimarlık Doktora Programı 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç.Dr. İhsan Derman 
Haziran, 1996
Fotoğraf görüntüsü geçmişte sanat yapıtı olarak kabul edilebilmesi için genellikle resim 
gibi geleneksel görüntülere bağlı olarak değerlendirildi. Bu çalışmamn ana konusu, 
fotoğrafın kendine özgü özelliklerini ortaya çıkarmak, ve resme ait kriterlerden bağımsız 
olarak hangi yollardan sanat bağlamına girdiğini incelemek. Bunun için, bu tezin önemli 
bir bölümü teknik ve geleneksel görüntülerin her ikisini de sanat üretimine bağlayan 
‘yenidensunum’un değişkenlerine ayrılmıştır. Bunlar arasında perspektif ve soyutlama gibi 
resme ait kavramların yanı sıra fotoğraf teknolojisinin getirdiği yenidensunum biçimleri de 
vardır. Daha sonra, fotomontaj ve kavramsal sanat gibi fotoğrafın avantajlarını kullanıp 
onu sanat bağlamının içine dahil eden bazı yöntemler incelenmiş ve fotoğraf ile sanat 
üretiminde kullanılan sıradan nesneler arasındaki benzerliklerin üstünde durulmuştur. 
Tartışmayı tamamlamak için de günümüzün sayısal teknolojisi, fotoğraf görüntüsünün bu 
teknoloji içindeki paradoksal durumu ve bütün bunların yenidensunum ve sanat yapıtı gibi 
kavramlara olan etkisi irdelenmiştir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Fotoğraf, Görsel Sanatlar, Yenidensunum.
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Preface
In the media dominated environment we are living, technical images are being 
consumed at an enormous rate through printed press, television and digital media. And 
possibly, the oldest form of image making to prevail in what we know as the mass 
media today is photography. However, in this image-world of the mediatic, an 
important problem becomes apparent; That of art's position. This position is getting 
more ambiguous in regard to, (or against, or within) the media as a general term, and 
photographs are the images to play on this ambiguity the most. The ‘Media,’ this rather 
abstract entity, works on the diffusion of differences of class, race, gender, color and 
also, o f what is art and what is not, let alone good and bad art. So, one should suppose 
that a new status for art/photography should be reinstated in the age of the media. And 
this, though not a plea for the resurrection of'Art' as opposed to the popular media at 
all, supplies a modest link between the purpose o f this research and the times we are 
living. That is, the grounds for its urgency, also for an artist, when faced with the 
impossibility of making photographs in a mediatic age.
As a practicing artist, I do feel the necessity to confront the issues of art 
theory, not as the legitimization of what I produce as artworks, but to understand the 
nature o f image-making and ultimately attempt to conceptualize a definition of this 
particular artistic activity. By this, I do not mean to disregard the importance of 
spontaneity and a degree of intuition in the making of photographs, and of art. But 
given the times and the special cultural context, and moreover, the puzzling relation 
between the idea of art and photographic images today, that is in times of picture
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making labeled as ‘post-photographic,’ a redefinition of practice becomes inescapable.
When visual arts are considered, this specific context is sometimes referred to as a
complete liberation, or an orgy, in which the artist is relieved from all the historical
obligations of art production: “Art can be externally dictated to, in terms either of
fashion or o f politics, but internal dictation by the pulse of its own history is now a
thing of the past.” (Danto 1992: 9) Thus, eveiything is permitted for the artist, since
nothing is historically mandated, in what Danto calls the “Post-Historical period of art” .
In fact, the validity of any argument on ‘representation’ should be questioned, since
they appear exhausied during this ‘orgy’, becoming irrelevant of the definitions of art:
The orgy is in a way the whole explosive movement o f modernity, with its
various kinds o f liberation -political liberation, sexual liberation,.....the
liberation o f art- the assumption o f all models o f representation, o f all models
o f anti-representation....... We have exliausted all means o f the production and
virtual overproduction o f objects, signs, messages, ideologies, pleasure. 
(Baudrillard, 1989: 182)
However, I value the rather odd cultural chemistry of a geography that 
contributes to one’s artistic production, that is, the case of Türkiye. At first, I see no 
problems of art being externally dictated to especially by ‘politics’, that is an extended 
idea o f politics. To me, this extended idea comes to mean that art itself has always 
been political, even when it deals with its own definition. In this case, politics is 
something to be separated from a professional status or practice, appointed either 
through force or an election within an apparatus that refer more to a practice of 
management (i.e. o f state). Real politics, if there may be such a term, is done through 
civil channels, and it involves cultural transformations. Obviously, for me, art offers 
the most functional field of this kind of a transformation, supplying a type of knowledge 
that no theoretical treatise can. But nevertheless, one should take extreme caution in 
order to separate art theoiy from politics in general. Consequently, when art is
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employed by politics, that is, an “aesthetization of politics” , then the questions 
regarding the existence of art is once more diverted into confusion.' This brings me to 
state that the kind of art theory this study will investigate in order to make clear the 
ways that photographs are contextualized as art, should diverge from the theories of 
media that explain photographic images as consequences of ideology in general, as 
shall be discussed in the introduction.
In any case, aside from all personal account on the choice of subject and how it 
relates to a specific time and a setting, the ultimate aim of this research is to build the 
foundations to claim that the photographic image is mostly ‘contextualized’ as art, 
rather than being an art object on its own right, independent of its conditions of 
existence and production. This requires a transfiguration: while the theories of pictorial 
representation suggest similarities in between pictorial arts (i.e. painting) and 
photography, the goal of this study is to show that ‘meaning’ in photographic image is 
far from being secure, and photographs are more apt to be appropriated within an art 
context, similar to the conditions of the everyday objects that go into a like circulation 
in order to ‘transfigure the commonplace’ and offer a unique type of knowledge. And 
this brings me back to the importance of the specific geographical location and the 
cultural conditions in which this research is conceptualized and prepared.
Throughout this written text, it will obviously be clear that almost all theoretical 
references follow a particular frame, that is, o f the western mind. However, this should 
not come to mean that I situate the particular condition o f Tiirkiye totally inside the
Walter Benjamin warns about politics being aestlietized in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction”: “ ....Fascism, ....as Marinetti admits, e.xpects war to supply the artistic gratification of a 
sense perception that has been changed by technology. This is evidently the consummation of 7 ’art pour 
I 'art.' Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is 
one for itself Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destniction as an 
aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic.” 
(1969: 242) Through this, I once more want to emphasize the current condition of ‘Media. ’
western frame of reference, or neither completely outside it. I simply want to suggest 
that this condition of being ‘in between’ creates a tension that is of utmost importance 
for generating ideas and concepts which in turn yields significant works o f art. But to 
separate this kind of production from the ‘regional’ and ‘folkloric’ traditions of art, one 
should refer to another tradition of a sort, that is a ‘technology’ of producing artworks 
that so occupied the western mind for ages. Obviously this term does not only signify 
the media or the tools of art production, but also the theory and an evolving philosophy 
that comes with it. And hence the importance of theory as such for this research, and 
further for the use of this understanding of technology in artistic production even when 
dealing with the local phenomena (ie.politics, as above). With the possibility o f citing 
various authors on the crisis of the project of enlightenment, and with it o f the western 
epistemology as evolved in the past several centuries, I once more want to stress the 
significance of the special conditions that this countiy possesses and possibilities it 
offers for an artist that can enjoy an insider’s information on its culture and can 
transform it to new modes o f knowing. And to me, in this case, photography becomes 
the most useful of means, as the special order of the non-western world makes itself 
manifest in visual terms, and particularly in the world o f objects. It means that this ‘in 
between’ condition, possibly a kind of social schizophrenia induced on the ones disjunct 
in between tradition and change (in the western sense), is reflected on the objects (of 
common use, technological or else) and the environment (mostly, built). In short, 
following the traces o f this special frame of mind as observed in visible phenomena, 
and using the photograph to displace the object, the possibilities of artistic production 
as a critique o f culture (both traditional and western) are obviously far reaching. To 
sum up, I should remind the reader that the conditions of the ‘heterotopia’ as an 
antithesis of utopia and as challenging the norms of the western behavior and thinking
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are relevant to what has been said above. The term, as defined by Michel Foucault, is 
further discussed in this thesis especially in relation to favorable cases in which 
photographs are contextualized as art. I do not want to claim that heterotopias fully 
explain the phenomena of specific locales (ie. Türkiye), but nevertheless they offer new 
modes of knowledge in the time of crisis.
Introduction
Apart from the histoiy of photography as a chronological classification of 
photographic modes (i.e.documentary, pictorial) as they relate to art, technology and 
society at large, the significant writings concerning photography can be said to have 
focused on two main issues, by a degree of generalization. In fact, whether these two 
can be completely separated still remains a question. In any case, if one is allowed to 
attempt pinning them down, they are as follows: The first issue specifically focuses on 
the nature of photographic image as a trace of the visible world. Within this account 
the operational mode of the photographic apparatus, as it specially is an 
anthropomorphic replica of vision and its mechanics, becomes important. In other 
words, whether as an extension of the human eye, or as simply imitating it, the camera 
image is the subject o f analysis within its confines. Thus at first look, the theories of 
pictorial representation as concerning the issues of resemblance, imitation, and by the 
same token, abstraction, appear to be more relevant to this category, somewhat 
excluding the social and ideological associations of representation. To extend the 
theoretical territory o f this category, one may include the psychology of perception, 
and furthermore the similarities and differences of photographic recording and 
memory. The perception of third dimension, binocular vision, and its two dimensional 
simile as the photograph occupies an important part in it. Even when this category is 
not fully apt to be labeled as the “natural” or “nature-bound” account o f photographic
image, it helped change the epistemological function of photographs in modern, 
positivistic culture.
Then comes the second issue, imbedded in the above cultural milieu, but 
concerning another ‘nature’ of photographs, that is, their ability to be easily accessible 
and be duplicated. In accordance with other modern phenomena as industrialization 
and mass production, the reproducible character of photographs had been the subject 
o f very important writings, all o f which foresee a transformation of culture and the 
artistic endeavor in modern times. Starting very early after the invention of 
photography, either as an aphorism of the new medium from the realm of art, ' or on 
the contrary, as offering immense possibilities in creativity, this category finds its 
ultimate form in Walter Benjamin’s writings. This transformation, which in turn refers 
to visual representation, at first marks a kind of democratization: a dispersion through 
the mass reproduction o f artworks by using photography. Thus, the destruction of the 
aura of the artwork, that is its imbeddedness in specific time and place as a unique 
object is the main theme of “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction”. (1969; 217-251) However, this is not the only way that Benjamin 
handles the question o f aura. Writing on Eugene Atget’s photographs, he comments 
thus:'
He was the first to disinfect the stifling atmosphere generated by conventional 
portrait photography in the age o f decline. He cleanses this atmosphere, indeed 
he dispels it altogether: he initiates the emancipation o f object from aura which 
is the most signal achievement o f the latest school o f photography. When 
avant-garde periodicals like Bifur or Variété publish pictures captioned 
Westminster. Lille, Antwerp or Breslau but showing only details, here a piece 
o f  balustrade, there a tree-top whose bare branches criss-cross a gas lamp, or 
a gable wall, or a lamp-post with a life-buoy bearing the name o f the town - 
_______________ this is nothing but a literary refinement o f themes that Atget discovered. He
'The very often quoted author on the subject of Ihe validity of photographs as an art form in the earh' 
days is Charles Baudelaire and his address for ihc Salon of 1859.
'Eugene Atget was active as a photographer in Paris roughly between 1900 and late 1920’s. While not 
being recognized in his lifetime, his posthumous fame came when his work was compiled and published 
by an American photographer. Berenice Abbot.
looked for what was unremarked, forgotten, cast adrift, and thus such pictures 
too work against the exotic, romantically sonorous names o f the cities; they 
pump the aura out o f reality like water from a sinking ship. What is aura, 
actually? A strange weave o f space and time: the unique appearance or 
semblance o f distance, no matter how close the object may be. (1979: 250)
From Benjamin’s point of view from early 1930’s, the transformation in the 
very notion o f art to anticipate the reproduction of images in mass media declared a 
transition from the formal logic o f traditional images -i.e. paintings- to that of the 
dialectical logic of photography, in Paul Virilio’s terms. As an extension of this 
argument on photography, and indicating a recent transformation, Virilio, writing in 
1990's, differentiates between the ages of the image as that of ‘formal logic,’ 
belonging to traditional images like painting; of ‘dialectical logic,’ for the age of 
photography and film; and of ‘paradoxical logic,’ belonging to video recording, 
holography and computer graphics. (1994: 63) The attributes of these, that are “real,” 
“actual,” and “virtual,” respectively, indicate the reconfigurations of epistemology in 
modern era. How photography takes its place in the paradoxical logic of our time, 
and how this redefines the field of art remains to be resolved. Nevertheless, it will 
suffice for now to say that the very notion of the photographic print as an artifact on 
paper, as an artwork with an aura itself, or as a commodity distributed through the 
regular channels of print media, or as an authentic record of reality, and its ties to 
problems of visual representation o f traditional media are to be questioned. The 
relative success of this study thus will remain in what is construed through the survey 
of these phases of image making that are validated as artistic production.
As a supporting argument, Jonathan Crary claims that the more important 
aspect of modernity is the observer that is shaped by historical-technological 
conditions, and especially when photography is concerned, by a ‘proliferation of signs 
on demand’:
Imitations, copies, counterfeits, and the techniques to produce them were all 
challenges to the aristocratic monopoly and control o f signs. The problem of 
mimesis here is not one o f aesthetics but o f social power, a power founded on
the capacity to produce equivalencies....... Photography and money become
homologous forms o f social power in the nineteenth century. They are equalh' 
totalizing systems for binding and unifying all subjects witliin a single global 
network o f valuation and desire. (1990: 13)
According to Crary, to take the ‘shifts in representational practices,’ that is, 
the modernist rupture from normative perspectival model of vision specifically at the 
end of the nineteenth century, is a futile attempt at isolating perception. Instead, the 
observer that is shaped by the optical devices including the camera obscura should be 
taken into account: “For the problem of the obsei'ver is the field on which vision in 
histoiy can be said to materialize, to become itself visible.” (1990: 5) Supplying a very 
unique link between the early nineteenth century mechanical aids to vision and our 
times shaped by the digital imagery, Craiy poses valuable questions for this research.
When art is concerned, an effort of this kind should take into consideration the 
historical outlook (not to say development) of the problem of representation, and 
moreover, its extended resonance in style, expression and abstraction in art. The past 
that is concerned here is to be bound to the existence of photography as we know it 
today, that is roughly 150 years. This necessity, by no means discarding the insight 
that previous artworks offer in above terms, is dictated by the need to reconcile the 
photographic image with the idea o f ‘Modern’, artistically. The main issue is the 
attempt to understand the course of photography through 19th and 20th centuries in 
close connection with, above all else, painting. In simplified form, this course can be 
laid out as possible answers to a number of questions put in chronological order:
1. What has been the effect of paintings on the photographic image in the 
nineteenth century?
2. Can the first question be reversed?
3. Could photography follow the apparent break (or discontinuity) in tradition 
that first the impressionists and later the cubists established in painting? After 
all, was this a possibility?
4. If not, what were the possibilities for photography to autonomously exist as 
an artistic medium?
5. How can we explain the role of photographic image in historical 
avant-garde art o f the twentieth century?
6. What are the possibilities of painterly abstraction in photographic terms?
7. What became of photographs since Pop Art?
8. Can the possible answers to these questions be enough to project into the 
era o f digital imagery?
Obviously, this set of questions directly aims to juxtapose the artistic 
parameters of photography with those of painting. Within the method of this writing, 
this juxtaposition will help to a certain degree. In most common accounts, 
photography as an art medium among the others is usually placed somewhere in 
between painting and film, sharing the static image with painting and the camera with 
film.(Bürgin, 1984:40) However, due to shifting emphasis on conventional art media 
through time and to techniques employed at intervals throughout the past 150 years, 
photography has also been placed next to theater (Barthes, 1991; 31), and even 
sculpture as concerned with organization of space. (Morgan, 1994: 59)
Meanwhile, the twentieth century modernism is considered to have a special 
interest in exploiting the optimum possibilities o f each art medium in itself as 
separated, a kind of search into the very essentials, for example, of photography. This 
kind of purism, as it is called by Grundberg and McCarthy-Gauss, (1987: 135) 
conceptually (and ironically) ties the problems of abstraction in painting, again with the 
‘photographic.’ But ultimately, whether any kind of juxtaposition or separation of 
different art media is plausible today is still to be answered.
The primary concern o f this research is not to write another ‘History of 
Photography’ as it relates to the issues of art. The reason for emphasizing this 
deserves special attention. The historian of photography, with some exceptional cases, 
attempts to work as an art historian, creates categories -artistic and else- in a 
chronology. Beaumont Newhall’s ’ and Naomi Rosenblum’s'* comprehensive books 
are good examples to this, in which categories, taxonomies, and series of photographs 
from 1839 to our time are arranged according to parameters of style, subject matter, 
approach, intentions and needs. These books come out as valuable source for this 
study, whose outcome, in turn, is not an alternative to these histories. But why the 
photographic image is extremely slippery to evade such categories and chronology is a 
major concern for the theme of this writing. ^
'See Beaumont Newhall, The History of Photography. New York; Museum of Modern Art, 1982.
■*See Naomi Rosenblum, A World History of Photography. New York: Abbeville Press, 1984 
’ In fact Roland Barthes points out to the same problem, that photographs are unclassifiable due to their 
nature. His whole quest to understand the essence of photography in Camera Lucida starts with this 
dilemma. This fact is. in turn, already demonstrated throughout his book with the arbitraiy choice of 
photographs, mostly portraits, that he investigates in order to comprehend “Photography.” Indeed, the 
"arbitrariness’ of his choice is one that can only be compared to conventional classifications. Othenvise. 
the> are ver\' carefully chosen in regard to the argument he builds up. This complies with his claim that 
in order to reach the "fundamental nature of photograpln' the photographs do need to be handled one at 
a time: ""In short, (in a photograph) the referent adheres. And this singular adherence makes it veiy 
difficult to focus on Photography: The books which deal with it..,, are victims of this difficulty.”
(1982: 6) Barthes calls this a "disorder'.
‘History of Photography’ in an illustrated book format, as mentioned above, 
induce significance and meaning on varied photographs: it contextualizes photographs 
under categories such as portrait, pictorial, documentary, landscape, photojournalism, 
scientific, etc. Some of these categories indicate an artistic style, and some simply refer 
to the subject matter in photographs, which Barthes calls the rhetorical category 
(1991: 4), while still other authors create categories in regard to the intention of the 
photographer (i.e, a photo-reporter) and the distribution o f photographs 
(photojournalism).
In chronological order, these histories usually start with an array of 
pre-photographic techniques employing the camera obscura, and continue with 
daguerreotype portraits, the earliest widespread practice and technique of artistic and 
commercial photography. Then come the debates of the mid-nineteenth century on the 
validity of photography as ait, mostly brought by the art establishments of the time, 
followed by what can be called the first pictorial phase of photography. Certain artists, 
notably O.G. Rejlander and H.P. Robinson, are included with illustrations, in defense 
o f photography as art mostly through painterly subjects o f the heroic, allegoric and the 
genre. Soon afterwards the power of image as document is discovered when French 
and British started taking photographs in A frica, Middle and Far East -the colonies- 
and notable Americans took their cameras to battlefields o f Civil War and to the 
wilderness of the then unoccupied American West to turn in documents of public 
interest. Still, the content is romantic, like vast landscapes and ancient civilizations, but 
an ambiguity beholds the historian as to how they should be classified. In a 
chronological order, the histories of photography include the late nineteenth centuiy 
experiments on freeze-motion photography, and other extended capacities of 
photographic equipment to record the subject in motion. The best articulated and
documented artistic movement in photography, that is Photo Secession as initiated by 
Alfred Stieglitz and others, come out in early 20th Centuiy as the most influential 
motive for generations to come. Then one begins to see the shift o f emphasis from 
Europe to United States. One view holds that as social reformers rather than 
revolutionaries, American photographers (notably Jacob Riis, Lewis Hine, and several 
others) took on the ills of society, making socially concerned photographs o f the 
workers, the poor and the underclass in late 19th and early 20th century.*  ^The history 
continues with American artist-photographers, like Edward Weston and Paul Strand, 
with strong convictions on the art of photography, followed by photographs in print 
media; the widespread use of photographs in terms of photojournalism, news, 
entertainment and advertising, throughout late 1930’s and the following two decades. 
To conclude, photography since mid 1950’s until recent times is either marked by 
social events in United States, or by its integration with other art media as an 
alternative to painting. To note one important point, it should be said that these 
distinct periods o f integration, both as in the historical avant-garde of Dada and 
Surrealism, and since Pop Art are routinely understated within the mentioned histories.
This oversimplified chronology itself points at certain problems. Throughout, 
one does observe anachronisms as certain photographs (not photographers) are 
located within a category with utmost hardship, if not arbitrarily.  ^It is by nature of the 
photographic image to be shifted around, defying style, mostly apt to be classified by 
its subject: the photographs of this thing as opposed to photographs ofthat one. Thus
''See Naomi Rosenblum, A World Histoiv of Pliolographv..Chapter 8.
’ To suggest that similar problems occur for a historian of painting is a relatively simple way out. Whal 
usually comes out as an exception in a chronology of especially modern painting might either be 
discarded as irrelevant, or else it is an early inno\ ation. What comes up as an innovation in 
photography is frequently bound to its subject: a new thing or a scene that has never been photographed. 
In this respect, it is very illuminating to follow Sontag's investigation on how photographs expand the 
realm of visible and define the beautiful, in On Pholouraphv.
it comes as natural to encounter other histories of photography that mainly focus on 
one single subject in chronological order: Architecture, portrait, etc.. Just to observe 
that a similar attempt is rarely a concern for a historian of modern art is only one 
indication that photography as a form of representation is of a unique nature.
In these histories o f photography, one single aspect seems to comply with, or 
synchronous with some chronological order, and that is the evolution of photographic 
technology. In no case the historian of photography could omit this evolution: it is 
always kept well under hand as a corollary, most often shaped into a parameter of 
photographic style and representation. When the cameras got smaller, the images 
changed, or as the films got faster the photography of motion became a norm. 
However plausible this sounds, it is a simplification of one kind that evades the basic 
understanding of photographic representation, as shall be discussed in this thesis.
Meanwhile, one photographic subject interferes with and cuts across the 
chronologies, styles, modes and all theories of representation, photographic and 
otherwise: that is, the portrait. It is by no coincidence that the critical histories of 
photography, if one may call it, that of Sontag, Barthes and Benjamin, pay utmost 
attention to portraits, outside all concerns o f art and other inherent characteristics of 
photographic image. It is the face in the photograph that the viewer projects on, 
contemplates, historicise and communicates, that no other way of picturing can 
similarly capture. When faced with portrait photographs that he can expand on, that of 
Kafka, or himself as a child, or those by August Sander, Walter Benjamin poetically
writes:
Immerse yourself in such a picture long enough and you will recognize how 
alive the contradictions are, here too: the most precise technology can give its 
products a magical value, such as a painted picture can never have again for 
us. No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his 
subject, the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the
tiny spark o f contingency, o f the Here and Now, with which reality has so to 
speak seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the 
immediacy o f that long forgotten moment the future subsists so eloquently 
that we, looking back, may rediscover it. For it is another nature that speaks to 
the camera than to the eye: other in the sense that a space informed b>' human 
consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious.(1979: 243)“
All this brings us to another possibility for handling the photograph as artwork 
(i.e. a purely sociological, political, or ideological treatise) by way of isolating it from 
parameters o f traditional art media. Put into a form of question, can there be found a 
uniquely intrinsic trait o f photographic image that enables us to set it apart from the 
issue of pictorial representation as a parameter of art theory in general? This should 
seem plausible; after all, the photographs lent themselves to all different usage, ranging 
from scientific and artistic, to propaganda, and as its last resort, advertising.'^ Within 
past several decades, the critics of mass media and especially commercial television 
have focused on what is broadly called ‘Cultural Theory’, closely incorporated with 
the Marxist theories, psychoanalysis and semiotics. As the majority of photographs are 
distributed through mass media, they are considered to be appropriate subjects for 
theories of culture as well. Victor Burgin, in an attempt towards establishing a 
definition o f ‘Photography Theory’ as distinct from history or criticism states this as 
such:
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“ In all three of the authors that supply the starting point for this argument, there is an evident feeling of 
■ deatlf’ in all photographs. Sontag calls this a “pathos” of the lost and long gone, that appears in the 
photograph once more to the viewer. Reading these three authors, my personal observation is that they 
w ere all facing the reality of death in their lives, while contemplating on photography. Sontag's other 
book that came out about the same time as On Photography was Illness as Metaphor, in which she was 
inspired from, and also fighting against her own illness, that is. cancer. Camera Lucida is the last book 
that Barthes wrote, in w'hich his sympathy for his dead mother is projected to an old photograph. And 
Benjamin is obviously the one among them w'lio already li\'ed in an “apocalyptic” time of his own mind, 
but ne\ ertheless induced by the coming of fascism. Mi.xed with religious beliefs, his reflections on mins 
(e\ erywhere) is a telling indication of the then coming catastrophe.
' .Alluding to scientific methodology, the possibility seems to be isolating the photographic images .and 
putting them through an analysis with the parameters of socio-political history of past 1.^ 0 years. In fact, 
certain efforts of re-writing art histoiy in abo\ e terms have been attempted (as in Hadjinicolau's Sanal 
Tarihi ve Sinif Miicadelesi )as artworks, that is paintings of a certain period, being an effect of the 
histoiy of class stniggle.
What I am proposing as the ohjecl o f theory is not restricted to photography 
considered as a set o f techniques....; it is, rather, photography considered as a 
practice of significxilion. By 'practice’ here is meant work on specific 
materials, within a specific social and historical context, and for specific 
purposes. The emphasis on 'signification' derives from the fact that the 
primary feature o f photography, considered as an omnipresence in everyday 
social life, is its contribution to the production and dissemination o f weaning. 
(1984: 2)
Indeed, language and ideology have always been involved in recent theories 
of art as well as culture, when representations are concerned. However, as a 
methodological concern for this research, a semiotics of photography poses certain 
problems. Even though there is a degree of insight offered by the critique of 
photographic image as a system of signs and signification, it falls short to account for 
the ways that photography intersects with the idea of art. Barthes was very much 
aware of this:
If we except the realm o f advertising, where the meaning must be clear and 
distinct only by reason o f its mercantile nature, the semiology o f Photography 
is therefore limited to the admirable performances o f several portraitists. For 
the rest, with regard to the heterogeneity o f ‘good’ photographs, all we can say 
is that the oh feci speaks, it induces us, vaguely, to think.... At the limit, no 
meaning at all is safer... (1991: 36)
Just as it is the case, many critics who in the past few decades took language as 
a model for photography-as-representation focus on the photographs in the service of 
either advertising or political propaganda."’ The problems should be apparent: even 
the terms to replace ‘analysis’ (of photographic image), that are to ‘decode’ or 
‘decipher,’ allude to some sort of conspiracy, a hidden (and hideous) intent against 
masses either in advertising or propaganda through mass media. Obviously there is 
truth in this; it is an ideological matter, or more precisely, some ideology produce and 
distribute majority of photographs that need to be fought against or, by the same token
Victor Bürgin, “Photographic Practice and Art Theory", in Thinking Photography. One should also 
note here that one of the most widely debated topics of the past three decades involves advertising, 
feminist theoiy and representations of women in media. In fact, this not only happens on theoretical 
lc\ ei. since a rapidly increasing number of the women artists working with photography confront the 
issues through their work.
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praised, but in any case their meaning to be deciphered in order to be neutralized. The 
problem lies in the deficiencies of this decoding system to account for the ways that 
art operates, to point out the instances that photographs signify the idea of art. To 
suggest that the photograph has no syntax is only a minor point to defy the field of 
semiotics, to render it as irrelevant for the purpose of this thesis. More important is to 
accept that art operates in a rather neutral field, sometimes totally indifferent with no 
value as utility, and what makes it ideological (i.e. political) works in a more complex 
way than that of either propaganda or advertising. Photography since its beginnings is 
the best testament to this, the photographs with the strongest ideological and aesthetic 
convictions now gone into oblivion. In respect to the field of semiotics and 
photography, the two decades that separate two of Barthes’s writings is very 
illuminating. Unlike what was quoted above, that is the limited scope of semiology in 
the analysis of the photograph, two decades earlier one finds him to be a lot more 
enthusiastic to apply a linguistic terminology to the photographic messages."
Thus the sources for this research are the ones that concern the nature of 
photographic images in terms of their specific characters as distinct from traditional 
media (like Sontag’s, Barthes’ and Benjamin’s as mentioned above) and their
complementary theories that investigate the transformations of this nature in the digital
'' In 1961 in an essay titled “The Photographic Message” Roland Barthes set out what he calls the 
'Pliotographic Paradox' as the sinuillaneous existence of denotative and connotative messages in the 
photographs: "..What does the photograph transmit? By definition the scene itself, the literal reality. 
From the object to its image there is of course a reduction -in proportion, perspective, color- but at no 
lime is this reduction a transformation (in the mathematical sense of the term). In order to mo\'e from 
the reality to its photograph it is in no way necessary' to divide up this reality into units and to constitute 
these units as signs, substantially different from the object they communicate...." Up to here, this 
■perfect analogon of reality’ seems to pose no contradiction with what he writes in ‘Camera Lucida'.
But as Barthes writes further, the possibilities of the connoted messages in the photograph become 
apparent:".. The photographic paradox can be seen as the co-existence of the two messages, the one 
w ithout a code (the photographic analogue), the other with a code (The 'art', or treatment, or the 
'w riting', or the rhetoric, of the photograph); stnicturally. the paradox is clearly not the collusion of a 
denoted me.ssage and a connoted message.... it is that here the connoted (or coded) message develops on 
the basis of a message without a coda. ..." See "The Photographic Message” in Photography in Print. 
Vicki Goldberg, ed.
domain, as will be handled in the conclusion. The methodology involves an analysis of 
the photographic image in regard to parameters of art, as they evolve in the past one 
and a half century. In this case, visual representation as the basis of art theory is taken 
to be the prime parameter in order to understand how photographs are contextualized 
as art. The difference between the terms ‘pictorial representation’ (which refers to 
making of a picture in terms of shape, form, depth and the like, and mostly engages 
sensory perception) and ‘visual representation’ (which engages a broader reception 
including the cognitive, political and ideological) should be taken into account 
throughout the text. On the other hand, one confusing aspect of the relationship 
between photography and art involves the passing of time and should somehow be 
handled with caution in this investigation. Complementary to the claim that 
photographs are mute surfaces lending themselves to varied sorts of uses through 
different channels of distribution and contextualization, the distance in time also helps 
elevating photographs to the realm of art. As an artifact repositioned by publications 
and museums-galleries, that is by an authority, the image and, symbolically, the 
content o f the past is preserved as an artwork of archaeological importance.'·
The photograph beautifies; it turns everything that it records into beautiful 
images. In one way, Susan Sontag’s On Photography is mainly dedicated to show 
how this is established, how the photograph looks more beautiful than mere reality of 
its origin. One of the distinctions between the intentions of an amateur photographer 
and the photographer as an artist is given as such: for an amateur, the photograph of a 
beautiful thing or a scene (i.e, a sunset) is a beautiful photograph. Contrary to this, the
'· Sontag comments on this point: "The particular qualities and intentions of photographs tend to be 
sw allowed up in the generalized pathos of time past. Aesthetic distance seems built into the veiy 
o.xpcrience of looking at photographs, if not right aw'ay. then certainly with the passage of time. Time 
ONcniually positions most photographs, even the most amateurish, at the level of art.” (1978: 21)
course of modern ait, closely knitted together with photographic images, is a series of 
attempts to show that anything can be beautiful when pictured. This detachment from 
what can be called ‘content’ is the main issue faced by the critics of modern art. 
Evidently it became the inherent logic of picturing the world, the means of pictorial 
representation that is left for articulation. In the meantime, photographs seem to be left 
out of the field o f aesthetics as the naming of the beautiful, or judged in regard to 
painting, and as such, evading their inherent nature in modern times. Sontag 
comments:
Initially judged by the norms o f painting, which assumes conscious design and 
the elimination o f non essentials, the distinctive achievements o f photographic 
seeing were until quite recently thought to be identical with the work o f that 
relatively small number o f photographers who, through reflection and effort, 
managed to transcend the camera’s mechanical nature to meet the standards of  
art. But it is now clear that there is no inlierent conflict between the 
mechanical or naive use o f the camera, and a formal beauty o f a very high 
order, no kind o f photograph in which such beauty could not turn out to be 
present. (1978: 103)
Meanwhile, a certain aspect of visual representation challenges the 
contextualizaton of the photographic image as art. Within the modern conception of 
art theory, as in Gombrich, the issue of an evolution (in the sense that all art owes 
more to the previous artworks, than they do to nature) holds a strong place. This can 
be handled in different ways. One is the evolution in the systematics of image making, 
for example the construction of a two dimensional image out of the reality of space 
around us. In this respect, the introduction of linear perspective come out as a giant 
leap to the scene, but then, the historical distribution of this evolution is anything but 
even or gradual. In fact the problem lies in the decision to reconcile the photograph 
with this kind of an evolutional^ view. On one hand, it is true that what we perceive as 
improvements come out of certain necessities, in close connection with discoveries in 
natural sciences. Meanwhile, the long and stalled periods in this evolutionary outlook
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have a lot to do with another necessity of non-aesthetic sort, that is, the need to 
convey the required narrative. In other words, there is a story to be told and there are 
proven methods of picturing it. What Gombrich calls ‘schemas’, which eventually lead 
to changes in artistic style, are the outcome of the function of art within a given 
cultural context. When photography is concerned, it looks apparent that one is faced 
by another quantum leap in regard to what constitutes reality. As a medium in 
between the observer and the physical world, that is in between the observing subject 
and the object, photography is long assumed to have altered the sequential schemas 
of traditional images and art.
In connection with this, the idea that the accuracy in resemblance yields a more 
realistic style o f art has to be reconsidered. Though, the cultural context observed in 
retrospect as belonging to a specific group or society, is a function of varied 
determinants that pose a major problem to a historian. But nevertheless, the more or 
less generalized episteme of the western world as laid out by Michel Foucault forms 
the first step towards understanding the nature of visual representations.’^  A variant of 
this argument is the fact that photographic images did play a role to transform this 
episteme, but by their specific nature they were not ‘shaped’ by the cultural function 
ascribed to visual representations. In other words, no schemas were involved in 
making photographs, albeit the ones employed by traditional images were adopted by 
photographers. In this respect, the first part of this study is reserved for a study of a 
number of concepts that were widely regarded as essential to art theory.
In this research, the intersection of these representational issues in between the 
domain of art in general and that of the photographic image is considered to be made
up of the following: mimesis, perspective, movement and abstraction. While
' Michel Foucault’s The Order orTliim’S (1970) is lakeu to be the prime source to found an argument 
on representation as a general term.
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apparently a subjective set of parameters, one should note that they constituted the 
crucial interaction in between the traditional images of art and that of photography. 
But the reasons why these parameters cannot completely be carried over to our time 
to render photographs artistic is also just as crucial for this research. The issue is not 
only that they are no longer as strongly relevant as they used to be in art theoiy, but 
also epistemologically, the reality that these parameters indicate is considered to be 
long replaced by another in the times we are living.
For the purposes of this study, the other kind o f ‘realism’ of the artwork that is 
primarily established through photography (instead of traditional images) is handled 
under the heading ‘Art as Photography.’ Thus, unlike the aesthetic parameters as, say, 
mimesis, the issues discussed under this heading concern either the techniques or 
strategies such as montage, art as concept and typology. Eventually, the ontological 
questions on the artwork posed by the readymade is found to be crucial when art as 
concept is to include the photographic. However, in no case these parameters are 
bound to an exact chronological order in recent history of art. For example, as will be 
discussed, the problematics of montage as regards the early avant-garde art o f this 
century, will crucially surface once more in the digital realm. And this brings us to the 
concluding argument o f the study, that is relationship of the idea of art and 
photography in the age of computers.
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1. Representation and Its Boundaries
At the very basis of a definition of representation, lies the concept of order. 
Simply put, it is order that enables man to comprehend the world, to be able to 
represent it, to himself and others in return; “ ...that which is given in things as their 
inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and 
also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, 
a language...” (Foucault, 1970: xx) As a general term, representation covers a wide 
range of expressions, or ‘signatures.’Order, and thus the possibility for representation, 
involves a series of classifications o f things and phenomena, through certain relations, 
and, most importantly, resemblances. As described by Foucault, the epistemological 
histoiy of western world, its systems of classifications and ordering had shown a 
continuous path since antiquity, until 17th Century. Within this classical epistemology, 
as the author names it, resemblances, and especially ‘analogy’ as a type of 
resemblance, stand out as the basis of systematics, o f understanding the world with 
visible and invisible relations. Analogy, in this case, works not only on resemblance of 
things, but also on resemblance of relations among things. Within this process of 
acquiring of the knowledge, Foucault writes, it is the signature, or, the ‘sign’ that 
makes the resemblance visible: “The world of similarity can only be a world of signs... 
The sign of affinity, and what renders it visible, is quite simply analogy; the cipher of 
.sympathy resides in proportion.” (1970: 27-8) And this, what he calls the sixteenth 
centuiy episteme, is poverty stricken because
Resemblance never remains stable within itself; it can be fixed only if it refers 
back to anothei· similitude, which then, in turn, refers to others; each 
resemblance, therefore, has value only from the accumulation o f all the others, 
and the whole world must be explored if  even the slightest o f analogies is to be 
justified and finally take on the appearance o f certainty. (1970: 30)
The above hardship, that is to wholly understand things and phenomena
through resemblances, leads him to conclude that it is the microcosm as the model of
the universe that guaranteed the contained and finite set of affinities among things. In
this episteme, the representative content of language had no role to play, but language
-syllables, words, syntax- was just as itself to be studied ‘as a thing in nature.’
At this point in analysis, representation through language, or more to the point,
the resemblance of words to the things they depict should be taken into account, for at
the basis of representation of any kind, including the pictorial, lies the same
problematic. To Foucault, the threshold of modern epistemology arrives at the end of
sixteenth century, when “..the peculiar existence and ancient solidity o f language as a
thing inscribed in the fabric of the world were dissolved in the functioning o f
representation: all language had value only as discourse.”(1970: 43) To put it another
way, certain theories of pictorial representation put forth the arbitrary link from the
picture to the world, analogous with arbitrariness of the link between the words and
the objects they designate. This view, categorized as ‘pictorial relativism’ maintains
that the problem of realism in pictorial representations is one to be resolved not by
‘imitation’ or ‘copy’ theory, but by the realism within the symbol system that
establishes this link.’’* Thus being constructed mainly as a cultural convention that
determines the ‘rightness’ of the symbol system, nature in turn becomes a product of
art and discourse. This marks the beginning of analysis of meaning and signification, in
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Brian G Conley, Tlicorie.s of Piclorial Rcprescnlalion. Conley considers Nelson Goodman lo be (he 
Ibrcmosl theoretician of this view.
which “the sign ceases to be a form of the world; and it ceases to be bound to what it 
marks by the solid and secret bonds of resemblance or affinity” (Foucault, 1970: 58)
In a general account, theories of visual representation emerge as the 
investigation of realism in the artwork, as the term ‘realism’ referring to a generalized 
idea. The major devices of achieving realism in this way are illusion and symbol, as 
polarized concepts. When the reality of representation is taken as an outcome of a 
likeness or a similarity to the depicted, an illusion is considered to be taking place. 
Whether it is an illusion of a three dimensional space and objects within it, or an 
illusion of a likeness (i.e. physiognomic), a picture is regarded to be a realistic 
representation through resemblance. Whereas when pictures are taken as symbols that 
are used to refer to objects, as Nelson Goodman maintains, realism is a psychological 
phenomenon that occurs to symbols as a system within a culture.'^ “Because of this 
any picture can in principle be a realistic picture of anything so long as the picture is 
assigned to the object within the most familiar representational system within the 
culture” (Conley, 1985: 5) In any case, the mode of representation provides the first 
step in understanding art and photographic images as well.
However, to quote Foucault for the fundamental argument concerning the 
condition of representations and to further it for an object’s status as an artwork, is to 
initially exclude theories of aesthetics that governed fine arts for a long time, most 
notably that o f Immanuel Kant. This rather complex situation is not exactly one of a 
binaiy opposition, completely cancelling each other: when Kant writes on the 
‘disinterested’ satisfaction that determines the judgement of taste, or, on the 
universality o f it, this does indeed support certain arguments in this research that claim 
similar conditions for the artwork to be totally free from a practical mission, as a
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' ’ Sec Nelson Goodman, The Laiieiiaacs of An.
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unique object that may or may not be judged on empirical grounds, and thus giving it
the highest priviledged status among other representations, scientific or else. But
however, specifically when photography is concerned, Kant’s aesthetics contradicts
many of the contexts that photographs are used for artistic production. Indeed the
veiy first contradiction rests in Kant’s statement that the judgement of taste is not
based on concepts, but it is purely aesthetical. That is, any representation’s status as
art does not reside on cognitive grounds. (1964: 280) The issue is not as simple as to
claim that all photographs are perceived, or better, appreciated on a purely cognitive
level due to their special and causal relation with the physical world, or that ‘art as
concept’ is more appropriate today than a kind o f ‘formalism’. More importantly, as
this research will attempt to show, the epistemological and ontological grounds for art,
and artworks with photographs, have been transformed radically not to fit in the
aesthetical categories as such. In fact, Foucault’s interpretation of Las Meninas or of
Magritte’s paintings can be the telling instances where differences become clearly
apparent, where the judgement of taste gives way to an articulation of concepts and
the work is worthy of an art status on the basis of this articulation. But in order not to
stress a cancellation in between the two as stated above, an interpretation of a key
point in Kant’s aethetics becomes important. In ‘Critique of the Aesthetical
Judgement’, Kant, in a very clear way, writes on the conditions of judgement of taste,
to come to the following conclusion regarding the aesthetical idea:
...by an aesthetical idea I understand that representation of the imagination 
which occasions much thought, without however any definite thought, i.e. any 
concept, being capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be 
completely compassed and made intelligible by language. We easily see that it 
is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which conversely is a concept 
to which no intuition (or representation of the imagination) can be adequate. 
(1964:318)
The importance of the above lies primarily in the sovereignity given to the 
artwork, as that cannot be translated into language. Although Kant is mostly 
interpreted as predominantly the founder of modern formalism (Hofstadter and Kuhns,
1964: 279), the complex articulation of his writings offer insights to understand the 
legitimate grounds for art even today, and parts, in its own way, representation in 
general from the aesthetical.
The very basis o f the claim that separates photography and traditional images
in terms of representation, also supplies the link between aesthetics and representation.
Mostly derived from Kant, this separation maintains that painting stands in a certain
‘intentional’ relation to its subject, whereas in photography this relation is ‘causal’
due to the fact that the photograph is always an image of something that actually
exists. And aesthetic interest, which in turn refers to art, first and foremost is to be
based on the former, that is, on the intention of representation:
The painting stands in this intentional relation to its subject because o f a 
representational act, the artist's act. and in characterizing the relation between
a painting and its subject we are also describing the artist’s intention......The
interest is not in representation for the sake o f its subject but in representation 
for its own sake. A id  it is such an interest that forms the core o f the aesthetic 
experience o f pictorial art... (Scruton, 1983: 110)
Consequently, the important trait that determines photographic representation 
is causality. Then, in fact, the object of interest is the object that the photograph 
shows, instead of representation itself “With an ideal photograph it is neither 
necessary nor even possible that the photographer’s intention should enter as a 
serious factor in determining how the picture is seen. It is recognized at once for what 
it is...” (Scruton, 1983: 111) This view thus maintains that the ‘history o f the art of 
photography’ had always been a field of successive attempts to break this causality, to 
introduce human intention into making of photographs in order to elevate it to the
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realm of representational arts. In this case , ‘understanding’ an artwork is to 
understand ‘a thought embodied in perceptual form.’'®
Otherwise, it appears to be evident that photographs represent by resemblance. 
Furthermore, any argument on th e ‘degree’ of resemblance that concerns all 
traditional modes of pictorial representations come out as irrelevant to photographic 
images, because photographs, since the beginning, are considered to be a trace of the 
things they visually represent, supplying a direct link between representation and 
reality. Thus, any articulation on cultural conventions that govern representation as a 
whole, or any attempt to take a photograph apart to its bare elements in order to 
reconstruct the path of representation (as in language) appears to be useless. But 
nevertheless, one can talk about the ‘indexical’ character of photographic images as 
such: the photograph may ‘point at’ a certain concept or phenomenon. Frequently, 
this function of the photograph is referred to as ‘representation as’, and it is usually 
associated with fiction. In other words, the photograph can be a second degree 
representation, that is, a photograph of a thing (or a scene, or a person) representing 
something else. In fact, this is one of the common ways that photography is 
contextualized as art all throughout its history.
However, in order to better comprehend how photography transformed the 
concept of representation by introducing a new ways of acquiring knowledge, and a 
new mode of representation, one has to look into representational issues from the 
other way around, as emerging from the photographic image itself. Sontag comments:
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While not untrue, this approach organize the problematics of art around aesthetic experience deri\ ed 
from traditional images and puls them into use without any credit given to the specifics of the 
photographic image, and thus defines artistic activity and value within the parameters long been 
questioned and superceded. Furthermore, with its emphasis on the cult of the artist’s genius and the 
craft of image making, it is deprived of the possibilities to pose serious questions regarding the 
ontological grounds of the artwork in our times.
A new sense of the notion of information has been constructed around the 
photographic image. The photograph is a thin slice of space as well as time. In 
a world mled by photographic images, all borders (“framing"’) seem arbitraiA·.
Anything can be separated, can be made discontinuous, from anything else.....
Through photographs, the world becomes a series of unrelated, freestanding 
particles; and history, past and present, a set of anecdotes... The camera 
makes reality atomic, manageable, and opaque. (1978: 22-23)
One may understand that with the photographic image the issues take on a new 
turn where one is confronted with a kind of ambiguity regarding the nature of 
representations. Foucault tells of an ‘empirical order’ that is established by cultural 
codes which govern language, perception, exchanges and, in turn, representations 
(1970: xx), while Sontag writes on a new notion of information. They both direct one 
away from the aesthetical in the Kantian sense which suppose an a priori judgement of 
taste, untainted by empirical knowledge. Indeed photographs had always taken a role 
in between the empirical and purely aesthetical, evading the borders of the two. Thus, 
what kind of an understanding of the term ‘representation’, (as related to 
photography) is apt to be labeled as ait becomes the major problem.
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2, Issues of Representation in Photography as Art
Just as painting has no identity until it is brought into the history o f painting, 
the history o f painting must be returned to the theory o f which it is a paradigm 
o f linguistic community. Art histories are examples o f theories o f cognition, 
and in that sense all art history has been commentary on the status o f  
representation. Theory is always the elaboration o f a cultural stubbornness 
concerning things in the world and how we deteimine their value...
(Steiner, 1992: 62)
The notion o f ‘representation’ plays a central role in investigations for 
understanding the process of art. When the term is further specified as ‘visual 
representation’, the investigations focus mainly on painting through the history of art. 
In return, for purposes of this study, the flat surfaces that carry the different modes of 
representation -be it a painting, a drawing or a photograph- are of primary 
importance. After the introduction of photography in 1839 and until the end of the 
nineteenth century, there had been varying responses from artists and especially 
painters to the photographic images. Even though the responses, especially from the 
established institutions in England and France, were mostly negative, almost eveiyone 
within or around the artistic realm had something to say about photography.
Moreover, artists ranging from Delacroix to Ingres and to Impressionists have made 
some use of photographs, even when they rejected the new medium as a branch of 
fine arts. The accepted norms of painting that favored a brand of naturalism, mostly 
dictated by Académie des Beaux-Arts in Paris and Royal Academy in England, were 
held against and incommensurable with what came out of photographs visually. One 
common belief among the artistic elite was that photography should be in seivice of
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the artist-painter as a reservoir of realistic images from visible world and, as in 
Baudelaire's words, “It must return to its real task, which is to be the servant of the 
sciences and of the arts, but the veiy humble servant, like printing and shorthand which 
have neither created nor supplanted literature.” Indeed, Baudelaire's idea was that 
poetry and photography were irreconcilable in the sense that poetry is the essence of 
art, and, of painting:
Poeti7  and progress are two ambitious creatures who hate each other 
instinctively. And when they meet on the same road, one of the two must give 
way to the other. If photography is allowed to stand in for art in some of its 
functions it will soon supplant or comipt it completely tlranks to the natural 
support it will find in the stupidity of the multitude... (1981: 125)
Taken as a forecast from an influential thinker on the arts, the above can be
seen as an attempt to maintain a higher status for painting as opposed to emerging
possibilities in mass production, not only of goods but also of potential works of art as
well. To better understand this mid-19th centuiy order regarding art, one should bear
in mind that it was again Kant who gave the very first place to poetry among all the
arts. Indeed one should also suppose that ‘poetry’ in this sense is to encompass more
than the mere practice it brings to mind, just as Baudelaire suggests, and that its
connotations apply to all fine arts, praising artworks o f high order. In Kant’s words.
Of all the arts poetry maintains the first rank. It expands the mind by setting 
the imagination at liberty and by offering, within the limits of a given concept, 
amid the unbounded variety of possible forms according therewith, that which 
unites the presentment of this concept with a wealth of thought to which no 
verbal expression is adequate, and so rising aesthetically to ideas. (1964: 327)
To carry the same argument into recent times, Gombrich stresses the
importance of the ‘stuff of poetry’:
Long before painting achieved the means of illusion, man was aware of 
ambiguities in the visual field and had learned to describe them in language. 
Similes, metaphors, the stuff of poetry no less than of myth, testify to the 
powers of the creative mind to create and dissolve new classifications. It is the 
unpractical man. the dreamer whose response may be less rigid and less sure
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than that of his more efficient fellow, who taught us the possibility of seeing a 
rock as a bull and perhaps a bull as a rock. (1986: 313)
Apart from the purely poetical, through non-ofFicial channels, painting and 
photography have strongly influenced and looked into one another as far as visual 
representation is concerned. Until the appearance of the photo-collage as a new 
possibility for the avant-garde in late 1910's, the series of interactions between the two 
media and the possibilities of photographs to become art can be analyzed witliin the 
following parameters.
2.1 Mimesis
Indeed, the very first approach to understand the meaning of representation
goes through the concept o f ‘mimesis,’ something that does not seem to be dictated
only for a chronological convenience. Upon reflection, this idea of ‘imitation of
nature’ may possibly considered to be the starting point on which the mankind first
thought of the nature of artwork per se. However, within the limited scope of this
writing, only some aspects, or better, interpretations of the term will suffice, rather
than an historical overview since The Republic.'^ Andrew Benjamin articulates the
issue with an analogy to a ‘mirror’:
The mirror brings with it the history of reflection. A vital part of that history 
has been the antagonism constructed by philosophy for art; this antagonism is 
encountered within, if not as, mimesis. The visual arts have always been ,
Most accounts of mimesis regarding arts, and especially painting, start with Book Ten of Plato’s The 
Republic. What should be stated here as of considerable interest is certain interpretations of The 
Republic regarding imitation through language as well, that is the relation in between the name and the 
named. Very much supportive of w hat Foucault labels as the 'classical episteme’, Walter Benjamin 
w rites on the historical development of the concept in "On the Mimetic Faculty” in One Wav Street 
and sets out the instances where language is directly involved.
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from within the terms set by this particular philosophical tradition, stniggling 
with an ideal type that can never be fulfilled. The mirror is from the start 
conceded as an impossibility. And yet it positions art within an equally 
impossible situation. Mimesis, representation and the figurative do at the same 
time acknowledge the ideal and its impossibility. (1991: 2)
One o f the apparent features of the imitation theory is the importance that it 
gives to the transparency of the medium of representation. For any kind of illusion of 
reality through mimetic representation, the medium should itself be invisible, that is, be 
not conscious of its own properties. Arthur Danto states that this situation is perfectly 
symbolized by a pane of glass
...which is presumed transparent, something we cannot see but only see 
through (as consciousness is transparent in the respect that we are not 
conscious o f it but only o f its objects.) If the pane o f glass were not a means, it 
w'ould be a metaphor for mimetic representation... The successful imitator 
does not merely reproduce the motif; he sublates the medium in which the 
reproduction occurs. (1981: 151)
Similarly, the photographic image as a transparency in literal and metaphoric 
sense complies with the above. The transparency is the pane of glass (the film) through 
which the world is observed and on which it is rendered. Sontag, in a comparison of 
traditional art media states this as such: “While a painting or a prose description can 
never be other than a narrowly selective interpretation, a photograph can be treated as 
a narrowly selected transparency.” (1978: 6)'" It is not by chance that mirrors and 
windows are also the metaphors for the classification of photographs in artistic milieu, 
as the photographers either look towards an outer reality through the window, or 
observe themselves in the mirror.
The apparatus within the photographic program today, as Flusser suggests, works similarly to hide 
its comple.xities to render the medium invisible. When taking photographs becomes a 'nature,' the 
apparatus becomes more comple.x in technical terms to support the ease of its operation. The 
demonstration of this phenomenon comes out through advertising for cameras, which repeatedly present 
them as the natural component of human body, an extension of the eye with the ergonomic features 
offered for the ease of operation b>· hand. Or. as a second nature, a fiilly automated process that sees for 
\ oii. but in obediance. For related argument sec Vilem Flusser. Towards a Philosophy of Photography.
.See John Szarkowski. Mirrors and Windows. New York: MoMA, 1968.
The relation of the photographic image with the wider concept of mimesis, 
however, is not one to be resolved as simple as it seems. Art theory had always 
involved an investigation of imitations, or the ‘reflections of reality’ to which 
photography replied with the reflections of appearances, true to its origins, but as real 
as the appearances themselves. So in the shallow field of the surfaces, photographs 
seldom attained the credibility o f ‘truth’ in the philosophical sense, ie. as that manifests 
itself in the artwork. When they were thought to be ‘like nature’, as Kant expected the 
true artwork to be, this was a kind of cover-up, or it signified a naturalization of their 
reception, their transparency.
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2.2 Physiognomic Likeness: Portrait in Photography
The anthropomorphic likeness of the photographic process had always been a 
common view in which the photographic lens corresponds to the lens in the eye, the 
diaphragm to the iris, and the photographic film to the retina. Even further, red, green 
and blue sensitive layers of the color film seem to be modeled after the RGB sensitive 
receptors among rods and cones. On one level (perhaps metaphorically), these 
similarities form the basis of truth of the photographic image: “Unlike any other visual 
image, a photograph is not a rendering, an imitation or an interpretation of its subject, 
but actually a trace of it. No painting or drawing, however naturalist, belongs to its 
subject in the way that a photograph does.” (Sontag, 1978:120) This understanding 
constitutes the cult value of portrait photograph, the ‘death mask’ as Sontag calls it.
Commercial portraiture was the very first field that photography took over 
very rapidly in the first several decades. Among the first practitioners of the new
medium were portrait painters and miniaturists, but, eventually, the majority of them
who tried to continue their craft in the traditional way after photography, were either
forced out of their occupation for economic reasons, or found new outlets for their
craft, like coloring daguerreotype portraits. Commercially, photographs were more
affordable for general public and the statistics show that 100.000 daguerreotype
portraits were made in Paris alone in 1849. (Scharf, 1983: 41). Outside the
commercial field that borders on a kind of ‘industry’, among the first established
artists to make use of daguerreotype portraits in paintings was Ingres, sometimes by
directly painting from photographs:
Ingres's early portrait paintings,.... are distinctly different in color from those 
executed after his return from Rome. In the first group the colors are cool and 
delicately tint the refined surfaces o f the porcelain-like figures. But in portraits 
after about 1841, they become warm and metallic, and as closely approximate 
to the hues o f coloured daguerreotype plates as they do to the fine precision
with which this type o f photograph described textured surfaces.....One might
reasonably characterize these later portraits as 'enlarged daguerreot\ pes'.. 
(Scharf, 1983: 50)
In fact, there had been a number of evidences showing that the photographic 
portrait had a strong influence on painting at the time, by a large number o f painters. 
These range from the pose that the sitters take, (usually the hand supporting the head 
during the relatively long exposure time, or a rather stiff look due to the mechanism of 
braces and head supports), to the correction of left-right reversal in self portraits, 
which were previously done from mirror images; and most importantly, to the sharp 
tonal differences in color, suggesting a transference from high contrast black and white
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All throughout the history of the pholographic image, (he tonal gradation in B&W have been a major 
technical problem, and especially in early years before the introduction of panchromatic emulsions, the 
unusual rendering of certain colors in tones of gray, and higher contrast had its traces obseiv’ed in 
painting. Even though this ma\ not explain the photographic light, color and tone in certain earlier 
paintings, nevertheless it does help explain, for example, (he fall-off in illumination on faces in the 
nineteenth century portraits.
When taken as an analogue of the physiognomic features o f the person, the
portrait photograph poses further problems in terms of representation:
The portrait photograph exists within a series o f seemingly endless paradoxes. 
Indeed, as the formal representation o f a face or body it is, by its veiy nature, 
enigmatic. And part o f this enigma is imbedded in the nature o f identity as 
itself ambiguous, for the portrait advertises an individual who endlessly eludes 
the single, static and fi.xed frame o f a public portrait. (Clarke, 1992; 1)
By now, it appears that a dialogue of one sort between photography and 
painting in most o f nineteenth century was about the supposed ‘realism’ that is 
conveyed in images by both media. In terms of photography, this issue was to be a 
matter of sharp and soft focus images, especially in portraits. Within the vague and 
non-standardized state of photographic technology, as told by historians, the details 
sharply rendered or subdued in photographs seem to be as much a matter of choice for 
photographers, as being dictated by technical matters. In this respect, two different 
camps emerge after a relatively broad generalization: The sharp focus images in 
England and softer ones in France. (Scharf, 1983: 77) As a result, an effortless 
deduction from this dialogue can be about the issue of poetry, alluding to Baudelaire, 
achieved in photography by the rendering of soft contours in soft focus images. 
Indeed, it is not clear that by this way the photographic line was mimicking the brush, 
and thus the painting as art. Nevertheless, this feature was to make its way well into 
the beginning of twentieth century, into what can be called the second phase of 
pictorial photography.
Another important issue in comparison of photographic portraits and those of 
paintings involves the time in the making. In other words, photographic portraits are 
mostly considered to depict the temporal expressions of the sitters, while the painter 
spends an incomparably longer time in order to find and execute the true expression 
that characterize the person. Indeed this view is plausible when the best of the painted
portraits are concerned through the histoi^ of art. But Walter Benjamin objects to this 
with what he calls ‘the optical unconscious’ revealed in photographs. Used as a 
general characteristic of the photographic, especially in regard to details, this is 
explained as such:
It is through photography that we first discover the existence o f this optical 
unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through 
psychoanalysis....Yet at the same time photography reveals in this material the 
physiognomic aspects o f visual worlds which dwell in the smallest things, 
meaningful yet covert enough to find a hiding place in waking dreams, 
enlarged and capable o f formulation, make the difference between teclinology 
and magic visible as a thoroughly historical variable. (1979: 245)
Through these, it is easy to realize, once more, how elusive is the portrait 
photograph, while at the same time it is most commonly used to validate identity, just 
like a signature, an authentication o f existence. The optical unconscious, as told by 
Benjamin, bears resemblances with what Barthes calls the ‘punctum’: “ ...because the 
photographs I am speaking of are in effect punctuated, sometimes even speckled with 
these sensitive points; precisely, these marks, these wounds are so manypoiuis... I 
shall therefore callpnnctum...'" (1980: 26) Disturbing the ‘studium’, that cultural 
frame of reference for reading photographs and especially the portraits, for Barthes the 
punctum mostly appear in details much similar to the slip of the tongue, and deserves 
special attention, makes the image enigmatic. Furthermore, on personal basis, Barthes 
writes about how he ‘constitutes’ himself in front of the camera by posing, and thus, 
how his body is incapable of finding its ‘zero degree’ in the photograph, doomed 
'always to have an expression’. To him, photography always turns the subject into an 
object :
To see oneself (differently from in a mirror): on the scale o f Histoiy, this 
action is recent, the painted, drawn, or miniaturized portrait having been . 
until the spread o f photography, a limited possession, intended moreover to 
advertise a social and financial status.... Odd that no one has thought o f the 
disturhance (to civilization) which this new action causes. I want a Histoiy of
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Looking. For the Photograph is the advent o f myself as other: a ciiiming 
dissociation o f consciousness from identity. (1980: 12)
As stated in the introduction, the portrait in photography always escapes 
classifications, establishing an independent region through which the theories of art 
and representation slip by. One can well assume that this is another unique 
characteristic of the photographic image, however slightly different from those of 
reproducibility, instantaneity, temporality and else. In this instance, just as it does for 
the History of Photography, the portrait poses problems for this research as well. To 
reduce the portrait photograph to an object of analysis for political-ideological 
representations, as the theories of media frequently does, is to bypass the broader 
question of art. It is true that portraits are often contextualized within the realm of art, 
but however, this fictional-intentional use is always emphasized through the context 
(and even masqueraded in recent times), to counter-balance the ‘sincerety’ and the 
‘vision’ in the gaze of the political figure (and in that o f the model in an advertising) 
that one encounters in mass media.
2.3 Perspective and its Significance
“The history of naturalism in art from the Greeks to the impressionists is the 
history of a most successful experiment, the real discovery of appearances.” 
(Gombrich, 1986; 326)
This section is devoted to the study of evolution of linear perspective as the 
representation of space, its connections to tradition and the role of vision in art, and 
ultimately to its relation with photographic-optical devices and photographic image.
The claim is that the perspective construction of space is not merely a tool for making 
more realistic images, but also a determinant, and ultimately a philosophical 
component of comprehending the world we live in: That is, a world view. This view, 
although altered in art terms since the beginning of the twentieth century, will help 
better to understand the nature of photographic images, and, perhaps, to find a new 
role for it. For purposes of this research, a brief survey of chronology will suffice to 
obtain an historical outlook.
Willi Bartschi, after a short outline of the characteristics of Pre-Greek art, 
clearly points out that Greeks invented the perspective drawing in the sixth century 
B.C., and that, minor exceptions aside, a historical gap of its use follows until the 
rediscovei7  o f perspective constnjction in the fifteenth century.(1981: 8) Indeed, 
here the author is mentioning the proper males of linear perspective, rather than 
approximations in representing the third dimension. The earliest examples are those 
found on Greek vases, as perspective foreshortening of figures, but, importantly, 
lacking the element of a fixed standpoint which happens to be of utmost significance 
for the present study. In other words: “ ...Every single figure appears in its own 
perspective without relation to the whole and to the space.”(198I: 9) In fact, the 
above mentioned view of the world does presuppose the fixed point (the eye) for, first, 
constiiiction of perspective space (linear perspective), and then the placement of 
figures and objects within this constiucted space (free perspective): “Linear 
perspective is based on ‘central projection,’ in which the visual or projection rays 
converge in a central point or, conversely, radiate from it. This point, called the center 
of projection, is, as it were, the single eye of linear perspective” (Bartschi, 1981: 34). 
Through this historical outlook, the perspective representation o f space first appear in 
wall paintings of Greek colonies in Italy, notably in Pompei. Perhaps not very
surprisingly, the Greek-derived word ‘Scenography’ for perspective actually means 
‘stage setting’ and, it is a part o f optics that concerns how buildings must be 
reproduced in painting, characteristic of the wings of Greek theater. (Bartschi,
1981: 9) ,
On the other hand, Peter Galassi points at the manipulations of perspective 
system by artists as a kind of progression in a coherent history that he labels as ‘the 
role of vision in art’(1981: 13). Without doubt, the perspective construction of space 
as the effect o f a specific viewpoint and a particular moment in time, has its basis in the 
general framework of histoiy o f western thought since Renaissance, especially as it 
relates to ‘the order of the world.’ How the vision in art, and in turn the ‘normative 
visual scheme’ had foreseen the coming of photographic image is Galassi's most 
important argument. Based on examples from landscape paintings and sketches from 
roughly the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century. Before Photography is a 
reRitation of the widely accepted theory that photography caused the art o f painting to 
distance itself from a mimetic representation, and ultimately, ending in the destruction 
of perspective space. On the contrary, the study shows that the eye at the top of the 
visual pyramid of perspective started to play an active, decisive role well before 
photography became possible, and thus foresaw the fragmentary, analytical nature of 
photographic image;
Ever since Leon Battista Alberti published On Painting in 1435, a perspective 
picture has been defined as a plane intersecting the pyramid of vision. At the 
apex of the pyramid is the eye. The pyramid's base is the perimeter of the 
picture. The picture is the projection upon intersecting plane of eveiything that 
lies within the scope of the pyramid.. (Galassi, 1981: 16)
This phenomenon, while alluding to the gesture of photographing, also enables 
Galassi to make a distinction between two polar conceptions of perspective: to work 
from pieces to a whole; to synthesize, and, to work from a whole to an aspect; to
analyse. The landscape painter, with his sketch, analysed as did the photographer who 
was unable to ‘compose’ the picture (like a Renaissance painter), but could only ‘take’ 
it. Thus, here one can speak of the photographic perception of the world and can see 
how it is different from the preordained perspective space of the Renaissance artist, in 
other words, as already a given instead of being constructed by the artist. The visible 
world offers an unlimited number of fragmentary appearances for the photographer to 
eliminate, choose from, select and then to capture in a specific time and space, but not 
to compose. It is a fragmented view of the world, as far as ‘vision’ is taken as 
encompassing both perception and consciousness. However, one may think of the 
dialectical logic of photographic image as in line with the photographic perception of 
the world, a literal actuality in regard to time and space: the eidetic faculty of the 
photographic image as the record of interrelationships between things of the visual 
realm. Galassi comments:
Photography recorded not the physical reality before the lens but its visible 
aspect, determined by a specific point and scope of view, at a particular 
moment, in a particular light. The description was seamless, but only in two 
dimensions. The photographer ignored this fact at his peril, risking 
obstructions and discontinuities, fortuitous juxtapositions, and unexpected 
densities and gaps in spatial logic. (1981: 29)
When ‘vision’ is concerned, perspective takes on metaphorical significance as
well: “ .... (central projection) entails the representation of objects and their relations in
the field of view from a single and fixed point of view. Central projection implies 
subordination of the objects to a whole, the primacy of the whole over its parts, 
reference of the whole to the observer, who is thereby included in the picture....” 
(Bartschi, 1981: 10) The whole process has one implication: The individual at the 
center of the world. No wonder since Renaissance, pictorial representation had been
handled in terms of naturalism, a proximity to what is perceived, together with the cult
o f  the artist, the ‘eye’ on the world. According to Victor Bürgin:
The signifying system of photography, like that o f classical painting, at once 
depicts a scene and the gaze o f the spectator, an object and a viewing subject. 
The two dimensional analogical signs o f photography are formed within an 
apparatus which is essentially that o f the camera ohscura o f the Renaissance. 
Whatever the object depicted, the manner o f its depiction accords with laws of  
geometric projection which imply a unique ‘point o f view’. It is the position of 
point-of-view, occupied in fact by the camera, which is bestowed upon the 
spectator. To the point-of-view, the system o f representation adds ihs frame 
(an inheritance which may be traced through easel painting, via mural 
painting, to its origin in the convention o f post and lintel architectural 
construction); through the agency o f the frame the world is organized into a 
coherence which it actually lacks, into a parade o f tableaux, a succession of 
‘decisive moments'. (1984: 146)
While the photographic image fully complies with the rules of linear 
perspective ( in fact, since camera obscura) one should take caution in easily accepting 
that it has taken up the role of vision in art, as laid out by Galassi and others. The very 
fact that the central projection is based on the dominance of the whole over the parts 
due to the fixed viewpoint, indicates the synthetic order observed in Renaissance 
painting, favoring a balanced, frontal and symmetrical arrangement of perspective 
space. In other words, the perspective space is constmcted first, and then the figures 
take their place in relation to this space. The grid usually came into use to indicate the 
depth of space: “....Renaissance painters liked to suggest depth through the rendering 
of tiled pavements. Assuming as we must that the pavements are flat and the tiles 
identical units, we are compelled to read their progressive diminution as recession.” 
(Gombrich, 1986: 261) The whole process presupposes the ability to comprehend the 
space as the combination of identifiable geometric forms and solids. That is, the 
knowledge of Euclidian geometry, first to visualize the elements as they are projected 
to relevant orthographic planes, and then bringing them together in the linear 
perspective illusion of the third dimension. Importantly, any organic (non-geometric)
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form to take place within this illusion is usually regarded also as a combination of 
geometric surfaces. In this arrangement, veiy frequently, the meaning is induced on the 
central figure (the locating of vanishing point), to and from which, the lines converge, 
or, the light (the halo) emanates."'
For quite a long time, linear perspective established a strong bond between the 
photographic image and painting, as an issue of pictorial representation. As Aaron 
Scharf argues in Art and Photography, especially the second half of the nineteenth 
century is marked with comments on the perspective rendering provided by the 
photographs and some focus on the deceptive aspects of these renderings with varied 
focal length lenses. In any case, the use of perspective since Renaissance signified 
something more than its confirmation of optical truth; which had been more 
fundamental was to see the world that way, to supply the appearances with a pictorial 
order. The fact that the photographic apparatus worked accordingly by default 
basically sustained this order, and constituted the photograph as analogous to optically 
perceived while turning it into an object of aesthetical contemplation. On the other 
hand, what we now assume to be the radical shift in the beginning of this century, 
specifically referring to scientific views concerning the uncertainty and relativity of 
sense data and empirical models, for once separated appearances from reality. One of 
the major issues is to follow the course of photographic art in reply to pictorial modes 
of the modern avant-garde, as shall be discussed further in this study, and to admit
When photography is concerned, (lie light that forms the perspective rendering takes on a special 
significance. Barthes states: "It is often said that it was the painters who invented Photography (b>' 
beqnething it their framing, the Albertian perspective, and the optic of the camera obscura). I say: no, 
it was the chemist. For the поете "That has been” was possible only on the day when a scientific 
circumstance (the discovery that silver halogens were sensitive to light) made it possible to recover and 
print directly the luminous rays emitted by a variously lighted object. The photograph is literally an 
emanation of the referent. ...A sort of umbilical cord links the body of the photographed thing to my 
gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a carnal medium, a skin I share with anyone who has been 
photographed.” (Barthes. 1991: 81))
that the photograph’s status has changed since then, and that it attained a new kind of 
instrumentality in production of artworks.
To conclude, the last and perhaps the most important to mention regarding 
photography in relation to linear perspective involves the digital domain, a kind of 
virtual photography without the original object and a camera, but nevertheless, still, 
‘like photography.’ As will be discussed in the final chapter, the 3D objects being 
digitally modeled and ‘photographed’ (involving the whole terminology of 
photography and setup of the studio, complete with lighting and varied lenses) offer a 
complex set of new positions for re/presentation and art, while reciprocally the wire 
frame models for these ‘objects’ refer specifically back to Renaissance perspective 
with a kind of reduction to geometric components.
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2.4 Photography of Movement
Roughly since the Renaissance, the ‘history of vision’, if one may call it, has 
been marked by optical - mechanical devices. In certain accounts of this history, it is 
hardly the issue of visual representation that one may continually observe the effects 
of these devices. Or better, apart from the vision in art, the condition of the ‘observer’ 
is shaped by scientific and social possibilities that these offer. But nevertheless, all 
these optical-mechanical tools can be considered as the extensions of the human eye, 
enabling more than the normal scope of vision. It is by no accident that the histories of 
photography and cinema give a considerable weight to an evolution of this technology, 
usually starting with camera, obscura. In certain cases, and especially when movement 
is concerned, the camera obscura itself, long before the image could be fixed on a
plate, gained an importance for observing bodies in motion. Displacing the static image
of linear perspective with that of the impressions of the observer behind the camera
obscura, Jonathan Crary comments;
At the same time one must be wary o f conflating the meanings and effects o f  
the camera obscura with techniques o f linear perspective. Obviously the two 
are related, but it must be stressed that the camera obscura defines the position 
o f an interiorized observer to an exterior world, not just to a two dimensional 
representation, as in the case with perspective.Thus the camera obscura is 
synonymous witli a much broader kind o f subject effect; it is about far more 
than the relation o f an observer to a certain procedure o f picture making.
Many contemporary accounts o f the camera obscura single out as its most 
impressive feature its representation o f movement. Observers frequently spoke 
with astonishment o f the flickering images within the camera o f pedestrians in 
motion or branches moving in the wind as being more life-like than tlie 
original objects. Thus the phenomenological differences between the 
experience o f a perspectival constmction and the projection o f the camera 
obscura are not even comparable.(1990: 34)
Crary goes on to say that movement and temporality observed this way was 
always prior to the act of representation: “Movement and time could be seen and 
experienced, but never represented” (1990; 34).
Indeed, even without a recorded set of images, the observation of movement 
through the camera yields a significant difference from that of eveiyday perception, the 
one constituted by the apparatus between the world and ‘internalized’ observer. 
Naturally, the concepts of afterimage, persistence of vision and the like, paraphrased 
as ‘the solicitation o f eye (and possibly body) movement’ by Paul Virilio are the 
components o f perception of movement, that after the fixing of the image 
‘transformed into fixity by artificial lenses.’ (1994: 2) Nevertheless, the possibilities of 
fixing an instant of time by photographs toward the last quarter of the nineteenth 
centuiy is considered to be of high importance by historians, especially in regard to 
painting.”  As far as visual representation is concerned, the new imagery can be studied
" In Art and Photography. Aaron Scharf widely discusses the possibilities offered by the faster 
emulsions and consequently shorter exposure times that enabled photography of motion all throughout 
the second half of 19th. Centuiy.
under two distinct categories, developed notably by two photographers: The 
instantaneous, isolated images of animals and human figures in motion by Eadward 
Muybridge, and the chronophotography of Etienne Jules-Marey.
As a British photographer working in United States, Eadward Muybridge has 
managed to obtain private funding to start photographing the horses in motion by 
early 1870's. The series of photographs, later to include the human figure in motion by 
the support o f University o f Pennsylvania, were done with a battery of cameras, 
usually 12 or 24 o f them. The shutters being activated (later times at speeds of 
1/1000th o f a second) automatically by the subject itself, each camera recorded a brief 
moment in the lateral procession of movement. Indeed, combined with Muybridge's 
invention o f the ‘zoopraxiscope’ when viewing, the whole process took the form of an 
early version of cinematographic illusion of movement. More important to cite here is 
the fact that, these images o f frozen motion (especially of galloping horses) had been 
accepted with great enthusiasm among painters, when shown in Paris in 1881. The 
sensational side of the event is usually associated with the revelation that the horse, at 
certain instances when galloping, had all four feet off the ground without being spread 
in opposite directions as it was shown in previous paintings, like those by Gerricault. 
However, as far as representation goes, what is more interesting comes out of each 
figure being separated from the other in time. Emerging more like a record of scientific 
experiment, the series are analysis of motion in an ordered progression, when separate 
photographs are seen side by side. It is a demonstration in splitting time itself into 
minute intervals, in order to reveal the frozen subject in each interval. At the same time 
the figure, isolated from its immediate surrounding (a laboratory condition) and fixed 
symmetrically in the middle of the frame, do not enable one to see direct references to 
paintings o f the time. Moreover, the backdrop with a grid enabled the calculation of
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distance, much similar to recent photographic records of experiments in physics, 
mostly of free fall of bodies done by using multiple flash exposures."^ The grid and the 
object together, directly corresponding to the coordinate system of apses and 
ordinates and the ‘curve’ traversed by the object, made these photographs an object 
of scientific analysis; The photographed body transformed into the scientific proof of 
its speed in time and space.
From Degas to Francis Bacon, Muybridge's figures have been replicated in
paintings, as evidence shows, but the painters used the whole work as an inventory of
figures in motion:"’’ “An extensive atlas of human and animal locomotion; a
nineteenth-century equivalent to the medieval pattern-book” (Scharf, 1983: 219). On
the other hand, the ‘time-freeze’ of the photograph have not been observed as a
representation of movement on a two dimensional surface by many artists, but just a
static object suspended in time and space. Some went as far to say that:
Ocularly, they are false because they present us with an image at the moment 
when, because of its speed and the persistence of impressions on the retina, we 
should be unable to see anything but a blurred image, the shape of which being 
made up at one and the same time of the preceding and the following positions. 
(Guéroult, quoted in Scharf, 1983: 216)
Thus, the most truthful image was not ‘what was there, but what the eye saw 
there’. Scharf goes on to comment on the increasing acceptance of the blurred form 
as resulting in the promotion of late Impressionist paintings. In fact, contrary to 
Muybridge's photographs, and favoring the similarity with the retinal trace of moving 
object, the blurred image seems to be frequently used in paintings. Considering the 
favorable subjects for painters, and following the ‘impressions’ of light on water in
41
In most recent textbooks on physics, the multiple flash exposures of free falling or thrown objects 
are shown to demonstrate the gravitational force and acceleration.
See Van Deren Coke, The Painter and the Photograph
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motion, and landscapes of patches of colors and ‘optical color-mixings’, the fuzzy 
image on some photographs seem to have been preferred by many artists.
On its very basics, the representation of movement through photographs had 
always involved certain conventional codes to be read. In reference to visual 
perception, these codes can be associated with the manipulation of the Cartesian 
system in regard to which one perceives the world, and movement. One allusion is the 
induced movement in experiments on perception, in which the fixed system of 
reference is switched (as in the moving train), that is, the coordinate system of space 
itself moves, instead of the subject. In other words, movement is induced when the 
static ‘ground’ -instead of the figure- is moved. In terms of representation through 
photographs, this comes out through a convention established by the panning of the 
camera to follow the moving object, thus rendering a blurred ground and a sharp 
object, rather than vice-versa. In this case, the camera, as the center o f this system of 
references , takes on the role of the moving (scanning) eye.
‘Chronophotography’, on the other hand, worked on somewhat different
principles. Realized with a ‘photographic gun’ of Marey’s own invention of early
1880’s, the photographs rendered different phases of a moving body on the same
plate, enabling superimposed forms in succession using stroboscopic principles. The
results revealed more than the singular frozen figure, as Scharf comments:
Marey seemed more interested in the measurable graphic signs of movement 
than in the internal changes in the anatomical structure of the subject. He 
contrived to have the mobile figure record both its own trajectory paths and 
the oscillation patterns of its movement. (1983: 227-228)
Accordingly, most of liis ‘graphs’ done after the photographs follow the 
succession of chosen reference points on the moving figure, with single or broken
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lines,on a two dimensional coordinate s y s t e m . T h e  most common accounts on the
effect of these photographs on painting focus mostly on certain paintings by Marcel
Duchamp and more importantly on the works of Balia, Boccioni and Severini, that is,
the Italian Futurists, and to a degree, on Cubism.“  For the Futurists, this signified an
interest in “..the movements themselves rather than the objects in movement, the
fundamental rhythms and patterns of the universe - so great a preoccupation in this
century...” (Scharf, 1983: 255) The ‘simultaneous representations’ o f the
photographic image now made possible the transparency and superimposition of
different instances of the object on the same picture plane, and moreover, endowed
this mode of representation with the credibility of a scientific instrument. As Scharf
quotes from various Futurist manifestoes that have a touch of quasi-scientific
terminology, the preoccupation with representation of movement becomes apparent:
“Thanks to the persistence of the image on the retina, things in movement multiply, are
deformed, and follow one another like vibrations in space... motion and light
destroying the substance of bodies...” (1983: 264). To Boccioni’s ‘form-force’ which
represents the potential and expansive power of the object, Balia adds the
‘force-lines’, similar to the trajectory paths, the marks in painting (or sculpture) that
signify dynamism. To Balia, the work should be:
1.ABSTRACT 2.DYNAMIC Relative motion (cinematograph) + absolute 
motion. 3.EXTREMELY TRANSPARENT....5.AUTONOMOUS, ie. 
resembling only itself 6.TRANSFORMABLE...9.ODOROUS. lO.NOISY. 
Plastic noisiness adapted to the plastic expression. 11.EXPLOSIVE. 
Simultaneous appearance and disappearance in bursts.” (Manifesto of 1915, 
quoted in dell’Arco: 1987: 32)
Ob\ iously, of being very useful for conventional animation in two dimensions, the process can be 
considered as an anticipation of today’s ‘3D motion capture’ of computer animation 
The often referred painting by Duchamp is ‘Nude Descending a Staircase’. However, Duchamp 
himself, even admitting that he knew of Marey’s work, claims that this and other specific paintings 
Ifom 1910-12 were a reply to Cubism rather than a mere influence of photography or the Italian 
Futurists. Veiy typical of Duchamp, that is dissociating himself from apparent camps and influences, 
this point is widely discussed in de Duve’s Pictorial Nominalism and by the artist himself in Pierre 
Cabanne’s Dialoeues with Marcel Duchamp.
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In final analysis, it is apt to say that the photographic representation of 
movement had major impact on awareness that in turn formed the production and 
reception of artworks; photographs, paintings and even sculpture. Seen in a context, it 
is important to emphasize the fascination with motion, and more importantly with 
speed, and their representations at the beginning of the century. In fact, as the 
prevailing technological phenomenon of the mentioned period, the physical speed 
occupied an important place within art (as in Balia’s and others’ fascination with the 
automobile and the airplane) and seen as the all encompassing trait of modern life. 
Once more, the photograph had simulated the perception o f what Rudolph Arnheim 
calls the ‘optical motion’, “ ...when the projections of objects or of the entire visual 
field are displaced on the retina.” (1974: 379). But by fixing them permanently on film, 
the photograph falls short of the ‘kinesthetic perception’, that cooperation of eye, 
head and body movements. Within the limits o f this study, it does not seem feasible to 
comment on the relations between photographic representations and digital-virtual 
environments of today that engage kinesthetic perception, and furthermore what these 
offer as artistic possibilities. But it looks certain that our concepts regarding the 
physical speed has been altered and our fascination has been diverted into what Virilio 
names as ‘telepresence’, that is, the speed of light. How this is to be an issue of art 
and representation is yet to be solved. For sure, the photographic image of the thing 
in motion, at least for the majority, lost much of its appeal since Harold Edgerton had 
photographed the ‘crown’ o f the drop of milk and the bullet in the air.“’
”  Harold Edgerton is a photographer-engineer and the inventor of the electronic flash that is most 
commonly used in photography today. Since 1940’s he has been making photographs of motion, either 
freeze frame or with stroboscopic effects, that utilize the possibilities of the electronic flash which offers 
exposure times much shorter than any mechanical shutter. See Stopping Time: The Photographs of 
Harold Edgerton. Gus Kayafas, ed. New York; Harry N. Abrams, 1987.
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2.5 Abstraction and Photographic Possibilities
In contemporary artistic practices, the conceptual conflicts o f ‘abstraction’ 
and ‘figuration’ appear to be irrelevant, especially in the sense that their opposition 
does not create the tension to offer new possibilities as it did in early twentieth 
century. However, when problematics of visual representation are concerned to 
include photography, this discussion becomes useful as it relates to certain 
photographic modes. The aim here is not to give a thorough outline of abstract 
painting o f the historical avant-garde -i.e. in the second decade of the century- but to 
lay out the very basic definitions and concepts.
At the very basis of the discourse regarding abstract art are the seemingly 
interchangable concepts o f ‘intensification’ and ‘essentialism’ as defined respectively 
by an artist and an art historian; Piet Mondrian and Charles Harrison. According to 
Mondrian, intensification, as opposed to ‘extension’, suggests the path for the 
evolution in plastic art :
Both science and art are discovering and making us aware of the fact that time 
is a process o f  intensification, an evolution from the individual towards the 
universal, of the subjective towards the objective; towards the essence of 
things and of ourselves. A careful observation of art since its origin shows that 
artistic expression seen from the outside is not a process o f  extending but o f  
intensifying one and the same thing, universal beauty.... Extension results in a 
continual repetition of nature; it is not human and art caimot follow it.
(1987: 16)
Likewise, Harrison defines essentialism as such:
...the idea of abstraction as a process tends to involve a kind of
essentialism....The abstract tendency in modern art, tended to entail the belief
that a purer, or higher, or deeper, or more universal form of reality is revealed 
through the paring away of the incidental and ‘inessential’ aspects of things. 
(1993: 198)
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These attributes, not a definition of a style of some sort but rather rhetorical 
devices, are designed to explain a process of abstraction, from figurative painting to 
pure geometrical forms ‘in dynamic equilibrium,’ in Mondrians words. As regards a 
proper defining terminology of abstract art, the conventional one of ‘non-figurative’ is 
appropriate, as an abstract work of art is considered not to represent objects in the 
world. However, one more very important trait supply a better understanding, as far 
as representation is concerned. And that regards the abandonement of the 
representation o f the kind of space that recognizable, three-dimensional objects can 
inhabit.^^ These two, that is the abandonement of picturing the things in the world and 
of representation of space, are not exactly equivalent, but complementary within the 
process o f abstraction. Through this process, Mondrian tends to come out with a 
philosophical account of pure abstraction in order to realize the fixed laws of plastic 
arts:
.....which govern and point to the use o f  the constructive elements o f  the
composition and o f  the inherent inter-relationships between them. These laws 
may be regarded as subsidiary laws to the fimdamental law of equivalence 
which creates dynamic equilibrium and reveals the true content o f  reality. 
(1987; 17)
As another elaboration o f the aesthetic ideals o f truth and beauty, Mondrian’s 
thoughts on geometric abstraction in painting tiy to establish these ideals through the 
constructive elements of straight line (not a curve, as he writes) and form, and, their 
mutual relations. Moreover, in order not to represent relations with the natural aspect 
of things, the ‘denaturalization of matter’ come out as important. Thus, when color is 
concerned: “In painting, the primary color that is as pure as possible realizes this 
abstraction o f natural color” (Mondrian, 1987: 19)
Clement Greenberg, quoted in Harrison, p.200
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When all these are considered, a critique o f abstraction is apparently about 
narration and thus the difference between art and design. The relatively old problem 
that abstract painting takes on more the function of decoration has been put forward 
many times, a danger Kandinsky observes: “...what should replace the missing object? 
The danger of ornamentation was clear, the dead make believe existence of stylized 
forms could only frighten me away” Added to this is the fact that the mechanical 
execution of a geometric abstract painting had an allusion to machine made patterns, 
decorations and textiles. Harrison tends to defeat this criticism on the basis that we 
‘see in’ an abstract painting; “...we do not just ‘see’ the surface o f a painting, we ‘see 
in' that surface the evidence of intentional activity of some kind. It is its invocation of 
this expectation o f ‘seeing-in’, I believe, that most tellingly distinguishes abstract 
painting from ornament”(1993:203). This effort, though not totally clear, suggests an 
interplay with figurative painting, as we tend to see ‘figure and ground’, that is, one 
sort of pictorial space that contains the ‘object’. Though this time the object is not a 
representation o f a thing; in other words, the painting stands in place of a picture, but 
not a picture of a specific thing in Euclidian space. In fact one can say that the 
repetition of forms and lines in certain abstract paintings clearly bring in the ambiguity 
in perception of figure and the ground, and by this way look like mere decorations. In 
these cases, the obvious physical limits of the painting surface come into question: the 
function of the frame and the size of the surface and the causes for their existence as 
such. In form of a question, what prevents the painting surface to extend out of its 
boundaries, through repetition, to infinity?
Besides all these, a problem arises as abstract art questions the very necessity 
of representation as a parameter o f art theory, within a series of arguments. The first
29 Vassily Kandinsky, quoted in Harrison, p.204.
of these come from a misleading replacement of the term ‘abstract’ with that of 
‘non-representational.’ ®^ Representation had, in most cases, been associated with 
resemblance; in other words, the questions of representation are limited to questions 
about what it is that the work of art resembles. While resemblance, apparently, is not 
the only necessary condition for representation, at the same time, the ‘meaning’ in art 
is closely associated with the issue: “...For if there can be no representation without 
resemblance, then the pictorial order of the abstract painting must be seen as merely 
accidental, and thus as insignificant -meaningless- in human terms” (Harrison, 1993: 
200) So, even in the absence of evident likeness to the objects and habitable space, 
abstract painting is thought.to be representational in a certain way. The second 
argument in defense o f abstraction is against the involvement of representational 
models with language. In this sense, to take the issue of representation as the primary 
concern for analysis is an attempt to enable the existence of the artwork with its 
linguistic translation:
The primary function of tlae categoiy (representation/non-representation) has 
been to bridge an abyss between ‘untranslatable’ art and the dream of truth the 
beauty of art signifies; in brief, representation thematizes the problem between 
art and its linguistic analysis, providing an ostensive object of study where 
otherwise there might be silence. (Steiner, 1992: 9)
In this schema, as Robert Steiner suggests, “...psychology, theories of 
perception, and cultural critique offer vocabularies presumed to interpret the 
abstractions o f art.” (1992: 9) In fact, it is by no coincidence that psychology of 
perception still holds an important place in art and design education, following 
Bauhaus and especially modern architecture, to the same extent that geometric 
abstraction in art had been translated into issues of balance, equilibrium, rhythm.
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Like many otliers, Rudolph Arnheim uses this term to refer to abstract art in Art and Visual 
Perception.
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harmony, etc., in short the mechanics of perception of pure shapes and colors, and 
their interrelations as abstract entities.
Following this, through a linguistic analogy, abstract paintings can be thought 
to refer to things outside themselves, that is, other abstract paintings. Michel Foucault 
comments: “Insistent affirmation of the lines, the colors that Kandinsky called ‘things’, 
neither more nor less objects than the church, the bridge, or the knight with his bow.” 
(1983: 34) It is precisely at this moment that photography and abstract representation 
can be reconciled. At first, it looks obvious that photographic image and abstraction 
cannot be comparable, because of the very nature of photographs as the trace o f the 
human vision, rendered through the eye -the camera- and not abstractions which are 
detached from this vision. From here on, one can conclude that photographs, within 
the specific realm of abstraction as representation, can only imitate, or better, mimic 
the abstract paintings. And this provides the main argument of reconciliation of 
photography and abstraction.
Methodologically speaking, abstraction in art, aside from being an 
intensification or essentialism, involves concepts of reduction and tabula rasa, in 
analogy to the scientific ones of induction and deduction. The paralelism lies, indeed, 
in the methods of reaching ‘tnath’ or ‘beauty’ and/or both, in scientific and artistic 
terms. In order to understand how they relate to photographs, one should consider the 
terms through painting. Thierry de Duve, in his account on the historical avant-garde 
of early 20th century, writes that the idea of ‘tabula rasa’ (or the blank canvas, as he 
names) was entertained by many an artist, as what were to appear on this empty 
pictorial space was not dictated by nature itself Via an obviously clear reference, this 
does not correspond to the photographer’s unexposed film, contradicting with the very 
logic o f ‘taking’ photographs. Whether considered as a mental state attained by the
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artist or as the very basic or essential tools of picturing, the photographic mode is 
never likely to work in accordance. This idea, in majority o f accounts on painting, 
suggests that these basic tools -line, form and color- supply a pictorial language that 
can be evaluated within itself, with no external references outside that of the picture.^' 
Supplying another link in between language and pictorial representation, de Duve 
continues:
Klee, Kandinsky, Mondrian, Malevich each wanted in his own manner to lay 
the cornerstone o f a new language that they hoped would be universal, 
effectively non-speakable since it would be mute by nature, and yet speaking 
to everyone since the ‘rendering things visible’ (Klee’s words) which it gave 
itself as a goal, meant that it would make the visual speak, and speak in the 
language o f pure painting. (1991: 133)
The point, in fact, is not only to bring out the differences of a photographic 
language, if one may call it, with that of the one above, and obviously to show how the 
photographic line, form, texture or color, by their very essence different than those of 
painting. It is also to prove the methodological impossibility of inventing such a 
language.
The other way around, that is through a reduction from the “given” of the 
visible, can the photograph mimic the abstract painting. However, to speak of the 
degree of this reduction confuse the matters, and this already irrelevant attribution 
blurs the fine line between what is truly abstract and what is not. What concerns us
here is the relatively simple and well known practices that photography employs to
In Pictorial Nominalism de Duve, in regard to the specific context of the second decade of 20th 
centuiy, points out the interconnectedness of language theory of Saussaure with its counterpart in 
"language of pure colors’, as color is ‘named’ and theorized by artists. At this point, a very fundamental 
issue that separates the making of traditional images from that of photographs is about their respective 
modes of operation in regard to color. A painter starts with color (paint) either to achieve a faitliful 
resemblance to the objects depicted or, the opposite, to reduce from them in the way of making a 
painting, which is another object all by itself On the contrary, the photographer has, to start with, 
either the presence or the absence of light even when working with color photography. In turn, color 
itself in a photograph is dictated by reflecting surfaces, relative and in full respect to the amount of 
light received, and to the physical-chemical ways that the colors are ‘reproduced’, instead of being 
produced. No manipulation of color as reproduced through the classical-chemical apparatus of 
photography corresponds to colors that are produced in a painting. (The photographic color theories)
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achieve this mimicry. As an extension of the eye, the camera can pretend to reduce 
from the very objects in the world, firstly, through close up shots and sometimes 
through the extreme opposite, i.e.. aerial photography. In both cases, and with the 
absence of such clues as texture, the perspectival space can be altered, as does the 
viewer’s frame of reference regarding the coordinate system of vision. In fact, this 
effect can also be explained through the lack of clues regarding ‘scale’, as the surfaces 
on the photographic image are reduced to mere flat planes, without a reference to the 
actual materials and objects that make up these surfaces. It is not by chance that 
among the attempts to bring photography and art (painting) closer, the ‘suppression of 
detail’ in photographic image became essential, specifically by the pictorialists of early 
twentieth century. The texture of surfaces that is rendered obsolete through use of 
light, or lack o f it, or giving way to a pattern of photographic grain, is able to make 
the photograph a reduced image, a combination of pure forms, organic or 
geometrical. The second way to achieve this mimicry, a very photograpldc one by 
definition, is possible through the use of light, that is very contrast lighting conditions, 
in which the shadows -the black surfaces- take on the quality of two dimensional 
forms. The problems posed by this illusion are clear: the black surfaces on the 
photographic print, unlike the ones on a canvas, are readily perceived as referring to 
the absence of light. However, in certain cases, the perception is reversed in a delicate 
balance in order to perform what an abstract painting does.
So far, the above bring in a certain rhetorical stand against photography’s 
imitation o f painterly abstraction on a purely formal level. ‘Formalism’, in turn is 
another term of the rhetoric which has to be put in some context itself in order to 
make sense. Thus, the term is usually associated with certain texts (as with Kant’s 
aesthetics), or with a body of art criticism (ie. by the critic Clement Greenberg), and
3. Art as Photography: The Photographic Image as Integral
Element in Art Production
3.1 Montage and Surrealism
Among the techniques of photographic imagery, none has been more 
influential on today’s concepts o f visual representation than the photo-collage and 
photomontage. Within the context of early twentieth Century, these techniques refer 
to a wide ranging technological, social and artistic changes as the representatives of 
modern phenomena: from the macliine, war and destruction, urbanization and the 
urban masses as well as the individual, to psychoanalysis and the unconscious. They 
are assumed to be originated from the possibilities of halftone processes and the 
circulation of photographs in printed press, but in turn they have shaped the imagery in 
mass media in a long procession until our time, through political propaganda and 
advertising. In fact, today, the way the digital image processing operates owes 
considerably to the techniques o f montage and other photographic manipulations, as 
observed from the physical appearance of the computer interface and the screen menu, 
all the way to the final image: a point to be investigated f u r t h e r . O n  one hand, these 
processes can be seen as a further expansion on the ‘techniques of the observer’, with 
the possibility of a constructed reality through manipulation o f time and space.
A recent interview with David Ross, the director of Whitney Museum is examplary in showing how 
montage is considered to be the technique of the computer age. See Wired. Vol.3, N.9. Sept.95 p.l50
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surpassing that of the vision in common sense. Raoul Hausmann comments on the 
invention of photomontage:
...the idea o f photomontage was as revolutionary as its content, its form as 
subversive as the application o f the photograph and printed texts which, 
together, are transformed into a static film. Having invented the static, 
simultaneous and purely phonetic poem, the Dadaists applied the same 
principles to pictorial representation. They were the first to use photography 
as material to create, with the aid o f structures tliat were very different, often 
anomalous and witli antagonistic significance, a new entity which tore from 
the chaos o f war and revolution an entirely new image...(Ades, 1986: 24)
The term ‘photomontage’ introduced by Berlin Dada artists, Hausmann, Hanna 
Hoch and John Heartfield was distinctly separated from collage, especially the Cubist 
collage, and it signified a practice “..where the thing expressed is more important than 
the manner of expressing it, where the object represented plays the role of a word” 
(Ades, 1986: 15) It is common that the techniques of montage in photography are 
handled together with other art forms of historical avant-garde, specifically the 
Russian cinema and indeed literature. Not only the term ‘montage’ refers to an 
intrinsic practice in cinema, but also its connotations suggest a new comprehension of 
the world in relation to the theories of science, and of relativity, (theory of interval, 
non-Euclidian geometry and the fourth dimension) as well as the more obvious one of 
the ‘engineer-monteur’ o f Dada. As Douglas Kahn suggests the similarities in practice, 
“The mere contiguity of the (cinematic) frames constitutes a technical montage by way 
of juxtaposition and differentiation” (1985: 113) Thus to him, the process of montage 
is taken to be a combination of images both in cinema and photography to construct a 
kind o f reality. Other parallels can be found in acquiring the material to go into the 
montage. The photomontages of Berlin Dada, and especially o f John Heartfield were 
done mostly by found photos from printed material, just as propaganda films of 
Eisenstein used newsreels as raw footage. Kahn comments on the issue:
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This concurrence of labors is determined entirely by tlie characteristic of the 
material, which is first of all marked by the concurrence of physicality and 
sociality. All artistic processes must begin with raw material. Mass media 
qualifies as raw material by virtue of its violent reduction of communication 
and experience, actual and potential, past the reductions all cultural 
performances and products must work through. It is sufficiently reified to be 
handled physically in a manner of the traditional physical materials of the 
arts; wood, paint, metal, etc. Traditional materials, however, go through a 
transformation from physical to psychical whereas mass media starts out as 
psychical: its molecules are populated. (1985; 118)
Meanwhile, Anette Michelson gives an account o f the theorization of montage 
in cinema, after an outline of the filmmakers of ‘Intellectual Cinema’ in Europe, most 
importantly ofEisenstein: “The general aim was no less than the transformation of the 
human condition through a cinematic intensification of cognitive accuracy, analytic 
precision, and epistemological certitude”(1992: 62). And this, achieved by “dynamic, 
rapid inter-cutting, disrupting unity of time and space, the use of alternating close-up 
and distance shots, overlapping motifs, double exposures and split-screen projection,” 
(Ades, 1986: 87) had its counterparts in photomontage.
As far as representation is concerned, the photomontage seems to be employed 
by the historical avant-garde in several diverse modes. One, exemplified best by 
Heartfield aimed for a direct message as a political agit-prop image, accompanied by a 
text and mostly meant to appear in mass media, like the covers of AIZ (Arbeiter 
Illustrierte Zeitung) and also practiced widely by other Berlin Dada artists, realized as 
an indirect, ambiguous reflection of the ‘Zeitgeist’ representing the fascination by the 
machine and the metropolis. And second, mostly realized by the surrealists, had 
connotations o f ‘automatic writing’, the chance encounter o f objects in the picture. 
Rosalind Krauss makes a sharp distinction between the Dada-montage and the 
Surrealist photography, where the former “..expresses not simply the fact which it
shows, but also the social tendency expressed by the fact” (1985: 25) With a linguistic
analogy, Krauss further defines the representational nature o f montage;
If these works were able to ‘signify’, to articulate reality through a kind o f  
language, this was a function o f the cellular structure that montage exploits, 
with its emphatic gaps between one shard o f reality and another, gaps that... 
left rivers o f white paper to flow around the individual photograpliic units...In 
language this exteriority manifests itself as syntax, and syntax in turn is both a 
system o f connection between the elements o f a language and a system o f  
separation, o f maintaining the difference between one sign and the next, of  
creating meaning tlirough the syntactical conditioning o f space. (1985:28)
Thus, by sacrificing the reality of the photograph as a trace for this kind of 
‘language effect,’ the Dada-montage differed from surrealist techniques of 
photography, especially the darkroom manipulation. In fact the montage, in this way, 
reconstructs not only a new linguistic syntax, but also a new pictorial space as well. In 
terms o f meaning, very different from the cubist collage that includes the found, in 
place o f the painted, the montage had completely altered the perspective space o f the 
photographic image. And by this way it introduced an even more ‘primitive’ 
representation of a constructed reality in which our notions o f depth, size and 
relations gave way to a sort of reading that perhaps much resembles that of the 
miniatures, or a kind of hieroglyphics.
Meanwhile surrealists, and specifically surrealist writers like Breton, brought 
up the concept of psychic automation which was to dissolve the distinction between 
writing and vision. This in turn, according to Breton, was expected to “resolve the 
dualism o f perception and representation” (Krauss, 1985: 20) In order to replace 
representation, which can be suspected of fraud, the surrealists put forth automatism 
to turn visual representation into a kind recording of the unconscious, into ‘automatic 
writing.’ Krauss continues: “With this directness, automatism makes the unconscious 
present. Automatism may be writing, but it is not representation. It is immediate
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experience, untainted by the distance and exteriority o f signs.”(1985: 24) In any case,
the inherent problem of defining surrealism through unconscious activities of
automatism and dream manifests itself by a very wide range of painting styles from
Miro to Magritte. When photographs in the service of surrealist art are concerned, the
same problem holds true even among the work of one single photographer (i.e. Man
Ray), which range from sharp images to photograms, and to solarization and negative
printing. Where the identifiable Dada montage disrupted the ‘seamlessness’ of the
photograph ‘in an attempt to infiltrate reality with interpretation, with signification,’
the surrealists preferred to work with this seamless quality of photographs;
For photography, with its technical basis in an instantaneous recording o f an 
event, captures what we could call the simultaneity o f real space, the fact that 
space does not present itself to us as successive in nature, tike time, but as 
pure presence, present-all-at-once. By carrying on its continuous surface the 
trace or imprint o f all that vision captures in one glance, photography normally 
functions as a kind o f declaration o f the seamlessness o f reality itself.
(BCrauss, 1985: 28)
Rosalind Krauss, through a semiological analyses, further writes that it is 
mostly the darkroom techniques that surrealist photographers employed to guarantee 
the seamless look of the photograph, a faithful trace o f the visible, to imply “a reality 
that has composed itself as a sign” (1985: 28) Among these techniques to include 
solarization, negative printing and photograms, the doubling (of the parts of the image 
on the same print) come out as an important part of surrealist imagery; “It is doubting 
that elicits the notion that to an original has been added its copy. The double is the 
simulacrum, the second, the representative of the original. It comes after the first, and 
in this following it can only exist as figure, or image.”(1985:28) In fact it is commonly 
observed in surrealist photography that doubling takes place, mostly the doubling of 
body parts and organs, like eyes and breasts, which themselves are double and become 
quadrupled after the process.
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Somewhat in contradiction with the techniques mentioned above, there is a
view that holds on to the inherently surreal character of straight photographs. Susan
Sontag, deriving the argument from Walter Benjamin’s writings and his surrealist
sensibility, dismisses the image techniques of surrealist photographers of 1920’s as the
‘marginal exploits’ in the history of photography. This view, apparently not exactly an
art historical critique of a movement accompanied with a style (however diverse), is a
rather global account of cultural objects labeled as ‘surreal’ and of a sensibility, a way
of understanding phenomena. By refusing the surrealists’ claim that the ‘surreal’ is
something universal, that is a matter of psychology, she explains the intrinsically
surreal character of photographs in several arguments. The first of these involves
doubling of another sort: “Surrealism lies at the heart of the photographic enterprise:
in the veiy creation of a duplicate world, of a reality in the second degree, narrower
but more dramatic than the one perceived by natural vision.” (Sontag, 1978: 52) The
second argument is constructed around the photographs of the streets o f London,
Paris and New York, mostly done in 19th century:
These photographs, concrete, particular, anecdotal....-moments of lost time, of 
vanished customs- seem far more surreal to us now than any photograph 
rendered abstract and poetic by superimposition, underprinting, solarization 
and the like. Believing that the images they sought came from the unconscious, 
whose content they assumed as loyal Freudians to be timeless as well as 
universal, the Surrealists misunderstood what was most brutally moving, 
irrational, unassimilable, mysterious -time itself What renders a photograph 
surreal is its irrefutable pathos as a message from time past, and concreteness 
of its intimations about social class. (1978: 54)
In retrospect, it becomes understandable that most surrealists had this 
obsession regarding the time past, most specifically in Max Ernst’s use of commercial 
catalog illustrations of 19th century in his collages, or in Joseph Cornell’s 
appropriations of artifacts of the past in his boxes, or in the parts of architecture that 
Magritte depicted in his paintings. Even when all these do not shed light on the
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possibilities of making photographs in accordance with techniques of representation in 
a surrealist manner, they nevertheless show one of the ways that found photographs 
can be re-contextualized. As an offspring, the third argument that Sontag holds is 
deeply related to the act o f collecting as an indication of a surrealist activity. Again 
referring to Benjamin and his fondness for collecting (especially for collecting 
quotations), Sontag likens the photographer to a collector, who is specifically 
interested in the ‘rightness’ and ‘thereness’ of the object and its image, just as the 
collector is interested in the standards of genuineness and uniqueness of artifacts. 
Calling the photographs as instant antiques, she comments: “Like the collector, the 
photographer is animated by a passion that, even when it appears to be for the present, 
is linked to a sense of the past.” (1978: 77)
In terms of a method, the possibilities of collecting and of a contextualization 
within art happens to be common, when photographs are concerned. If the main 
theme o f this study is to analyze the ways photographs are contextualized as art, and 
to do this in reference to issues of representation, then, montage as a method, and 
‘surrealist’ photography as once practiced - together with other connotations of the 
term as referring to the photographic - can be considered as important instances 
where the previously given parameters of representation are in fact cancelled. Not 
coincidentally, when Foucault writes on the paintings of Magritte in This is not a Pipe, 
he is most focused on how an established order that conforms representation, 
resemblance and the linguistic is undermined through these works. Magritte does this 
by interchanging the word and the image, or by pitting similitude against resemblance, 
much like what Rosalind Krauss writes concerning photography. As Foucault states: 
“Resemblance has a ‘model,’ an original element that orders and hierarchizes the 
increasingly less faithful copies that can be struck from it. Resemblance presupposes a
primary reference that prescribes and classes.” And furthermore: “Resemblance serves
representation, which rules over it.... similitude circulates the simulacrum as an
indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the similar.” (1983: 44) 
Photomontage does the similar by simultaneously affirming the resemblance through 
the photographic image, and cancelling the order of space and time, much as in the 
same way with ‘heterotopias’ described by Foucault:
...I mean the disorder in which fragments o f a large number o f possible 
orders glitter separately in the dimension, without law or geometry, o f the 
heteroclite; and that word should be taken in its most literal, etymological 
sense: in such a state, things are ‘laid’, ‘placed’, ‘arranged’ in sites so very 
different from one anotlier that it is impossible to find a place o f residence for 
them, to define a common locus beneath them all. Utopias afford consolation: 
although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled
region in which they are able to unfold.....Heterotopias are disturbing,
probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it 
impossible to name this and that.....(1970: xviii)
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3.2 Al t as Concept
As a broad category Conceptual Art generally designates a cluster o f 
‘post-Minimal’ forms o f practice in which objects are mapped or proposed or 
prescribed or nominated, and in which those same or other objects are 
presented to view, if at all, only as contingent illustrations or demonstrations 
o f some ‘idea’. (Harrison, 1991: 47)
To start this section with a definition will help clarify how photographs are 
employed and given wider possibilities as conceptual elements in artworks. Charles 
Harrison is the editor of the art journal Art-Language and has participated in the 
activities o f the British group, Art & Language, which has been influential in 
Conceptual Art movement beginning in the second half of 1960’s, together with 
Joseph Kosuth in United States. The involvement of language and philosophies of
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language in Conceptual Art is evident since the beginning, as Jean Francois Lyotard 
comments:
After philosophy comes philosophy. But it is altered by the after....Between
the two philosophies of before and after, words are revealed as things, 
signifiers are grasped as enigmas, writing is set down as a material tiling. In 
other words, thought is art. One mad act is completed, that of giving the world 
a picture, a Bild, of well-formed propositions. Sentences are not propositions 
concerning events; they are events that happen in the world of speakers, under 
the same mbric as resonant, plastic, visual, or tactile arrangements. (Lyotard 
quoted in Kosuth, 1991; iv)
In a way, conceptual art can be viewed as a kind of ‘de-materialization’ of
art, rejecting the validity of different art media such as painting or sculpture as an end
in itself In this sense, the theories of representation as related to traditional arts, to
‘picturing the world’ are being criticized, together with aesthetics as a relevant issue
in art production. Once more attempting to define the nature of art, and the “form” of
the artwork after the readymades by Marcel Duchamp, Kosuth states as such:
It is necessary to separate aesthetics from art because aesthetics deals with 
opinions on perception of the world in general. In the past one of the two 
prongs of art’s function was its value as decoration. So any branch of 
philosophy which dealt with ‘beauty’ and thus, taste, was inevitably duty 
bound to discuss art as well. Out of this ‘habit’ grew the notion that there was 
a conceptual connection between art and aestlietics, which is not tme...
When objects are presented within the context of art (and until recently 
objects always have been used) they are as eligible for aesthetic consideration 
as are any objects in the world, and an aesthetic consideration of an object 
existing in the realm of art means that the object’s existence or functioning in 
an art context is irrelevant to the aesthetic judgment. (1991: 16)
In fact, this kind of a polemical stand was already put forward by many of the 
historical avant-garde of 20th century. The “manifesto” (ofDada, Futurists and 
others) had been a testament to the existence of the debate, a refusal of established 
norms in art and its relevance to aesthetics as such. In that sense Kosuth, especially 
through his writings, can indeed considered to be the last example of an avant-garde 
tradition in modernist sense, his statements being perhaps the last examples of a 
manifesto with a very strong conviction on the nature and the function of art. And that
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function is primarily an investigation into the definition of art. In this instance, for 
conceptual art, it was never a matter o f ‘representation’ of a pictorial kind, or a 
medium, i.e. painting or photography, that could all by itself reveal the true function 
of art.
The polemical character of conceptual art in opposition to what Kosuth calls
‘formalist art’ is also imbedded in the specific setting and artistic tendencies in early
1960’s, that is the Abstract Expressionism in painting and its theoretical proponents
such as Clement Greenberg. However, the new movement was not totally based on
this rejection, setting itself up as a field of polemical discourse within the art world.
Rather, as Kosuth maintains. Conceptual Art attempts to redefine the field o f artistic
activity independent of any given visual media: “Being an artist now means to question
the nature of art. If one is questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be
questioning the nature of art. If an artist accepts painting (or sculpture) he is accepting
the tradition that goes with it.” (1991; 18) Kosuth finds traditional art media to be
connected by virtue of their morphology, which presumes various givens. First is the
art medium itself as a given boundary, offering limited possibilities in its ‘language’ as
a closed system. Connected to this, the second determinant is in fact related to
tradition, that is, a kind of evolution within this morphology. In other words, Kosuth
states that a modern artwork as painting justify its position as art on morphological
grounds, and moreover in reference to previous paintings as such: “Art’s ‘language’
remained the same, but it was saying new things,” and he credits Marcel Duchamp for
showing that there can be another language:
With the unassisted readymade, art changed its focus from the form o f the 
language to what was being said. Which means that it changed the nature of 
art from a question o f morphology to a question o f function... All art (after 
Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually.
(1991: 18)
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Obviously, these raise questions as to how to handle the photograph in such a 
practice detached from all concerns of art media as given: that is, the photograph not 
as a kind of representation (i.e. a reduction from ‘reality’) but simply as a presentation.
As long as the photograph is a presentation , it is expected not to hide the meaning 
behind, as Lyotard suggests:
Thought is art because it yearns to make ‘present’ the other meanings tliat it 
conceals and that it does not think. There is, in art as in thought, an outburst, 
the desire to present or signify to tlie limit the totality o f meanings. This excess 
in art and in thought denies the evidence o f the given, excavates the readable, 
and is convinced that all is not said, written, or presented. (1991; xvi)
Foremost, this condition of being a presentation requires that a context for 
the photographic image to be created with a supplement, usually a text.
At first, the term ‘conceptual photograph,’ as it came up in quite a few articles, 
does not seem to be designating anything specific to the practice. One definition may 
provide an initial idea o f what it should be: "As a testament to the existence o f the idea 
or event it records, the conceptual photograph is a document rather than a formalist 
exercise in artful composition. "(Colpitt, 1992: 11) On the 'event' side o f this definition 
is the use of photographic images, mostly, in the later forms of dematerialized (or 
concept based) art, such as performances and actions. The photographic record of 
these, rather than being exliibited, mostly meant for publications, and then, more and 
more, this gave way to video recording and even shaped some recent examples of 
video art. On the other hand, as an illustration of an idea, the photographic print has 
been regarded important for the dematerialization of art, together with xerox copies 
and other relatively cheaper forms. This was also due to the fact that conceptual text 
or photograph as primary information, lost nothing in reproduction and could well be 
distributed through books and catalogues.”
”  All these efforts to establish a new idea for art object against the commodification of art (especially
As mentioned before, the early examples o f conceptual art were primarily 
language based. This was "..entirely within the linguistic infrastructure which 
previously served merely to support art."(Colpitt, 1992; 12) One of the first 
conceptual artists to work in this way is Joseph Kosuth, in his 'Proto Investigation 
Series'. In 'One and Three Chairs', 1965, he presents three forms of knowing an object: 
its photograph, its material form (the object itself) and its definition in the dictionary.
Such uses of photographs in conceptual art is contextualization of a kind, in
which the photographic images serve as the document of the idea that initiates and
make the real substance of the work, as Robert Morgan states:
In a photograph, one experiences the image in relation to cognition; tliat is, one 
discovers a set o f  givens about the image which in turn identifies it as a 
reference to some other place and time. The process o f cognition, in this case, 
is dependent upon understanding the reality o f the image apart fi'om its 
representation. In light o f the fact that a photographic document operates as a 
posteriori information, insofar as it represents an object or event other than 
itself, the viewer must then come to terms with its relationship to the present.
At this point the photograph ceases to be symbolic; instead it becomes a literal 
thing; in Conceptual Art, it becomes data or documentation or simply 
information. (1994: 34)
This employment of the photograph, in the service of a broader mission in 
search for a new definition of art and the artwork, has its own problems as well. But 
nevertheless, it should be stated that this kind of a contextualization is more valid than 
attempts to render the photograph artistic through pictorial conventions, especially 
borrowed from painting. Morgan claims that in the case o f photographs in 
Conceptual Art, “The challenge for photography criticism becomes one of 
distinguishing the context in which a photograph is shown. Before any aesthetic 
judgment can be made, it would seem appropriate for the viewer or critic to consider
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painting) proved to be somewhat flitile within the short history of conceptual art. The dynamics of this 
is be> ond the scope of this research at this stage.
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the intent of the photograph -in terms not only of what it means but of how it 
functions.” (1994: 55)
Aside from these, one should note that conceptual art, although radically anti 
formal, originated in a questioning of the nature and definition of art itself, and much 
of it deals explicitly with knowledge. That is why the photographic image should fit 
into this scene as pure information. Referring back to the ideas on analytical and 
synthetic in art, one may well assume that photographs, as surfaces carrying 
information, needs to be handled accordingly. In order for this information to be 
processed, there should be a methodology governing the production of photographic 
images. On the analytical side and in scientific terms, this methodology may even 
require the control of certain variables (of the photographic apparatus) that determine 
the image within a series. This is perhaps one of the most meaningful uses of 
photographs in an artistic context, as shall be discussed in the following section.
3.3 Typologies
Marc Freidus, in his introductory essay for an exhibition titled ‘Typologies’ 
defines typology, in a simplified form, as a collection of members of a common class
or type:
... It could be a grouping o f physiognomic types, vernacular buildings, or 
species o f monkeys. A typology is assembled by observation, collection, 
naming and grouping. These actions allow the members o f the class to be 
compared, usually in search o f broader patterns. These patterns may reveal 
biological constants if the subjects are living things, or social tniths if  the 
subjects are human creations. (1991: 10)
Indeed seemingly more suitable for scientific methodology, rather than an 
artistic endeavor, the term ‘typology’ poses a challenge for the common appreciation 
of art, or rather for the view that completely separates the informative means for 
sciences and arts. However, typology for scientific purposes is apt to be appropriated 
by artists, for the very reasons attributed to the term by scientific minds. In close 
inspection, a lot of artists have, for a long time, produced artworks in a series, or (in a 
loose usage of the term) of a certain ‘type’. But the ‘type’ mentioned here have close 
associations with the idea o f ‘style’. Once one can see the style and the norm to be 
interchanged in artistic production, new possibilities begin to emerge. And 
photography, as a tool for artistic and scientific representations, accepted to be the 
most proper for this purpose since its beginnings in 1839.
Aside from natural sciences, the use of the concept of typology is frequently 
employed, not surprisingly, in the field of archaeology. William and Ernest Adams, in 
Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality give a synthetic (in the sense that the 
definition is synthesized after a lengthy introduction on ‘type’, ‘class’, ‘typehood’ and 
the like), and scientific definition of the term ‘typology’:
A typology is a conceptual system made by partitioning a specified field of 
entities into a comprehensive set of mutually exclusive types, according to a 
common criteria dictated by the purpose of the typologist. Within any 
typology, each type is a category created by the typologist, into which he can 
place discrete entities having specific identifying characteristics, to distinguish 
tliem from entities having other characteristics, in a way that is meaningful to 
the purpose of the typology. (1991: 91)
For the purposes of clarification, one should refer to Adams’ book for a 
number o f times, starting with the idea that there is no qualitative difference between 
scientific thought and everyday thought. (1991: 40) Indeed our sensory perception of 
the world leads the way to categorize or to classify different appearances and
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phenom ena, objects and mental constructs. Here, one should note the important
diflFerences betw een classification and typology:
...a typology is a particular kind of classification, made for the sorting of
entities. A type, unlike other kinds of classes, is also a sorting category....
Classifying is, veiy simply, the act of creating categories; sorting is the act of 
putting things into them after they have been created. One is a process of 
definition, the other of attribution.” (1991; 47)
From here on, one can start drawing the similarities within the discursive field
of the arts, again based on the Adams’ theoretical foundations. The first one is the
subjectivity in creating o f  the typologies, as the authors suggest that every type is both
discovered and invented: “ ..The physical members o f  the type (at least in the case o f
archaeological types) are discovered, while the mental conception and the description
o f  the type are formulated, or in other words invented, by human m inds.” (1991; 33)
The second parallelism is to be found in the ‘representational’ character, as a type
involves a com bination o f  material; mental and representational, (verbal or pictorial)
d im ensions.(1 9 9 1 :30) The third, and perhaps the m ost important parallelism is drawn
out o f  the field o f  sem iotics, as typology is considered to be a restricted language and
the terms ‘langue’ and ‘parole’ are incorporated into this language system:
... We will suggest that formulation of any type involves a continual feedback, 
or dialectic, between its physical, mental, and communicative aspects... At 
least in open typologies, types evolve through use and experience like the
words in any other language....Langue consists of the underlying structure of
the typology, its purpose, the variables and attributes that have been selected 
in accordance with that purpose, the rules of generating types on the basis of 
those variables and attributes, and the idealized type conceptions that have 
been generated thereby. Parole, in the case of types, actually involves two 
different kinds of performance. First, as in all languages, there is a 
communicative performance.... We will refer to tliis as type representation.
But in the case of types there is also sorting performance: an ongoing dialogue 
between ourselves and the artifacts, so to speak. That dialogue may affect our 
type concepts even more than does the communicative performance.
(1991:50)
Thus, laying the foundations for the legitim acy o f  the typological approach as 
a generator o f  a discourse, and so an artistic strategy, one should start looking into
important cases in photography. The first to be mentioned is August Sander, a German 
photographer who undertook the seemingly impossible mission to photograph the 
representatives of every social class, profession, and the like (shortly, a portrait atlas) 
among German people, roughly between the years 1910 and 1935. Without any help 
from social scientists, Sander formulated his typologies in a so called ‘Semi-Medieval’ 
guild system, a mental construct of his own. In his lifelong project titled ‘Citizens of 
the Twentieth Century,’ the portfolios are arranged so as to start with the ‘Farmer’ 
(the earthbound man), going into the ‘Metropolis’ (the high civilization), and coming 
down to ‘The Last People’ (the idiots, sick, insane..). By no means a hierarchical order 
of social status, the headings for portfolio groups is listed as such, indicating the 
working methods of the artistiThe Farmer; The Craftsman; The Woman; The 
Professions; The Artist; The Metropolis; and. The Last People. All in all, the 
complete portfolios were to contain 540 photographs, but Sander’s work was cut 
short by National Socialists, who confiscated much of his work in mid 1930’s. Within 
the artistic Zeitgeist o f Germany between 1910 and 30 that favored experimentation, 
expression and political commitment, it does seem odd that August Sander pursued 
quietly his long term ambitions that were scientifically laid out and objectively 
executed.
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Perhaps, the impossibility of the task stems from the subject itself (the human beings) wliich poses the 
most complex problem for the idea of a typology. From a humanistic point of view, one may even get 
terrified with allusions to earlier pseudo-anthropological photographs of different ‘races’ of tlie world, 
that mostly helped racists, rather than scientists. The photographs from Sander that survived the Nazi 
prosecution proves to be the opposite, and their importance for today’s viewers is indispensable as 
mentioned by great many liistorians and art critics in recent times.
However, the later German photographers who work in a similar vein prove that this is not a 
coincidence. Without relying on the stereotype of the “industrious Gennan”, one may perhaps claim that 
there is something about tlie land (heimat) that grounds its people on certain sense of objectivity. At the 
same time, whether Sander was against the grain of his times is explained by Ulrich Keller: “In 
Sander’s effort to understand people as products of their respective environments and occupations there 
is a clear challenge to the middle-class ideal of the ‘autonomous personality’, which Sander himself had 
propagated throughout his life. As Sander declared often enough, he wished to represent tlie ’type.’
Ho\  ^ever, he sacrificed tlie autonomy of the individual only in favor of a larger social framework.... 
(1986: 36)
When typologies are concerned, the concept of physiognomy (the physical 
appearance) should be handled within the realm of portraiture, types and the nature of 
photographic images. As mentioned before, the most significant use of photographic 
process since the beginning has been in portrait photography, that is, the cult of 
personality as observed on the mute surfaces of photographs. Not only the image of a 
person in a photograph is the center of attention, but also the enormity of meanings 
attributed to the physiognomic details, to the pose, the clothing and especially the 
hands make the portrait a prototype for reading into all photographic images, even the 
most ‘abstract’ ones. As banal metaphors of everyday use, one can easily speak of, 
say, a portrait of a building or the physiognomy of a landscape, in photographic terms, 
expecting as though the very essence of the object will reveal itself within the sharp 
details of photographic image, just like the person’s character is expected to do in a 
good portrait. But further away from these metaphors, and specifically concerning this 
section, is the connection one can suggest between the concept of typology and that of 
physiognomy as the physical look of the ‘thing’, in fact since Darwin. Michel Foucault, 
in his analysis of the Cartesian frame of knowledge, describes this modern episteme as 
dependent on comparison through measurement and order:
Such, then, are the two types of comparison: the one analyses into units in 
order to establish relations of equality and inequality; the other establishes 
elements, the simplest that can be found, and arranges differences according to 
the smallest possible degrees. Now it is possible to use the measurement of 
sizes and multiplicities in establishing an order... (1970: 53)
After all, what else do we have to understand the world around us? This 
naively positivistic viewpoint, for all the different reasons, has been observed in recent 
photographic typologies in art context by many critics. Put in other words, and in 
form of a question; what happens when the artist takes his/her subjectivity out of the
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artwork, as the true scientist does, and abandons the artistic style in favor of a norm or 
a type? What if the artist replaces the ‘aesthetic judgment’ with the control of variables 
that determine the look of an image, just as in a scientific experiment? For one thing, 
the artwork that comes out is not about scientific truth, as will be discussed.^®
Before concluding, the last point to mention about the concept of typology in 
photographic art is about the ‘display’ of the series o f photographs. On the one hand, 
this aspect can be related to the subject of contextualization, in the museum, gallery 
space, or in a book format, in other words a contextualization induced by the channels 
of distribution. Thus, when Bechers’ work is shown in a museum of applied arts (it 
actually did), the meanings it acquires are expected to be somewhat different than 
when it is shown among other works of art. On the other hand, and of more 
importance for this study, is the way that the series are displayed on the wall, in groups 
or in a book format; in other words the mode of presentation chosen by the artist. As a 
significant strategy for the typologist, Sander, for example, intended his photographs 
to be reproduced in a book format, within the portfolios mentioned above. Bechers, on 
the other hand, grouped their series on the wall either in a grid format (i.e. three high 
and three wide), or in a linear fashion. If  sorting is a function of typologies one step 
ahead o f classification, these choices allow us, the viewer, to make a comparative 
observation among the members of a type, analyzing their similarities, and also, their 
differences. The representations of a type work to ensure accuracy in relative rather 
than absolute terms.
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In any case, this is what Bernd and Hilla Becher have been doing in tlie past several decades: In their 
most comprehensive typology of ‘Water Towers’, the photographs were all made from the same angle of 
\ iew. at a certain time of the day, under an overcast sky that supplies the most uniform lighting, and, 
importantly, tlie image of the subject occupied a certain size on the photographic paper as to allow a 
comparison among the members of the type. Quite independent from the intentions of the iutists, the 
■ unexpressiveness’ in their work has been contextualized by artistic authorities within ‘Minimalism’ 
and "Conceptual Art’ of recent times.
As a mental construct, it is mentioned that the typological approach can offer 
the possibilities to construct a discourse for the artist, just as it does for, lets say, a 
social scientist. In the case of photography, this has been frequently observed as a 
resistance against disappearance, or loss. Put in other words, the will to classify, 
record and preserve the expendable. In Sander’s work, this was the social stmcture of 
Germany on the verge of destruction, and in Bechers’ the last remnants of an 
industrial era, once praised and now long obsolete in the age of information. Today, in 
an era o f rapid change (and to most, decay), one would take the easy way to ascribe 
the function on photographic image. But much more important than this utilitarian 
view, the typologies in photography assumes a critical purpose in this mediatic age. A 
few remarks on the idea o f ‘type’ in relation to advertising media and its nemesis, the 
political propaganda should be recalled at this point. When one thinks that both 
propaganda and advertising employs photographic images for (and perhaps only for) 
the creation of stereotypes, the issue becomes clearer. Whether in the representation of 
Aryan Race, The Civilized World, The Typical Orient or Black Africa, or, by the 
same token, the ideal male or female body, the rich, the poor and the society in 
general, both apparatus work on the idea of ‘sameness’. As an antithesis, the 
photographic typologies, inversely, show us the differences among the members of a 
type (and not a stereotype) much more than their similarities. Observed side by side, 
neither two of Sander’s ‘Craftsman’ are same (or even similar), nor any of Bechers’ 
anonymous buildings. After all, if a truth is to be revealed through an artwork, in this 
case, it is to be found among the nuances (not the contrasts) of the physical
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appearances.
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4. The Readymade and its Connections to the Photograph
When Marcel Duchamp introduced the readymade into art in 1917, it was a 
fundamental comment on the "object" of art. To see this gesture merely as a statement 
that anything can be institutionalized as a work of art is an underestimation. What was 
at stake was also the ‘retinal’, and this would prove to be the starting point for a 
transformation in art perhaps more important than the introduction of linear 
perspective. Indeed the Duchampian readymade is a distant relative of later objects 
that were introduced, designated and contextualized within the realm of art. 
Nevertheless, historically, these later developments are all traced back to this first 
strategic decision.
As a generalized paradigm, the history of modern art has observed one 
important mission throughout different art media, and that can be defined as the 
elimination of everything that are inessential to an artwork, especially to specific ait 
media. To use art’s default dichotomy between form and content (now largely 
transformed by recent art theory), this purification of a sort is already handled in the 
techniques of abstraction, as related to the ‘form’ of the artwork. In regard to painting, 
abstraction as a reduction from the visible aspect o f nature had reached to its 
ultimately purest form in 1920’s, as exemplified in Malevich’s “Black Square” by 
Thierry de Duve. In fact, after this, whether it was possible to continue being a painter 
and practice the craft o f painting was the dilemma that Marcel Duchamp faced. To de
73
Düve, this marks Duchamp’s transition from painting to the readymade, and it 
indicates an offspring (the readymade) of a tradition, that is, the tradition of painting:
“.... the readymade, far from being a gratuitous and accessory fantasy in the art of
Duchamp, was his principal contribution to contemporary art, since above all else, it 
reinterpreted the past with such a pertinence that endowed it with a new 
resonance”(1991: 188).
On the other hand, to search into the purification o f the ‘content’ of the 
artwork in modern avant-garde poses the ontological question of art. Long detached 
from the concerns of the narrative, of its cult value and stripped of its aura, art began 
to exist as a disinterested tautology in itself That is, as Kosuth mentions, art justifies 
its existence with no external references other than itself and the ‘idea’ of art: a self 
defined entity, its very existence being a testimony to its condition as art. In no way 
that any externally dictated mission (i.e. political or aesthetic) could ontologically 
define the artwork.
The application of the same paradigm to photography, that is the elimination of 
the inessential from photography as art, appears as an injustice of one kind. After all, 
how can anything visible be not essential to the photographic image, which ‘depends’ 
on them for its very existence? In the modernist history of photography, this required 
that the elimination of the inessential meant the elimination o f inessential ‘object’ or 
‘texture’ or ‘detail’, that is, a kind of fragmentation of the visible. In this sense, if there 
is an essence to be revealed, it is the essence of the isolated fragment. How the idea of 
the readymade contributes to this condition of the photographic image is the concern 
of this chapter.
In epistemological terms, the readymade, at first, is ‘not’ to be regarded as a 
representation: “With the readymade the representational function is simply chucked
out. The bicycle wheel doesn’t represent a bicycle wheel, it is one.”(James, 1991; 283) 
Within these terms, the readymade introduces the ambiguity related to one of the main 
problems of art, that is, the transformation of the physical object. If the readymade is 
not a representation of a sort, how can it transform the object itself, given that this 
transformation is a necessary condition through which art operates? In fact, in certain 
regard, the same ambiguity beholds the photographic image, posing similar problems 
as to how the photograph transforms its object, or better, transfigures the 
commonplace in Arthur Danto’s words, and what is at play in between the object and 
its photograph.”  Obviously, a simile of this kind supplies the very first link in between 
the readymade and the photograph, opening up a new understanding of the art object 
in relation to both. The massive amount of writing on Duchamp’s work indeed gives 
varied accounts of how the readymade is to be evaluated, ranging from a dichotomy in 
between the retinal and conceptual, to the mold, cast and seriality of mass production, 
and to the idea of fetish. However, the complex ways in which the common objects 
are contextualized as art today is still far from being totally exhausted and probably 
much diverted from initial intentions first figured out by Duchamp in the second half of 
1910’s. ”
The first account on the readymade to be mentioned here stems from the term 
‘nominalism’ “as a way of thinking that conceptualizes from the name, belongs to the 
abstract if not to metaphysics or idealism.”(James, 1991; 280) In fact, Duchamp was 
very much involved in this way of thinking as is evident through much of his work and
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Danto’s book The Transfiguration of Commonplace is an investigation on how mass produced 
objects are viewed as artworks, whereas the identical thousand others are seen as mere utencils or 
household goods. Based on the multiple common items that are contextualized as art by especially 
Warhol in a popular context, rather than Duchamp’s readymades that operate on different means, the 
book is a survey on the crisis of representation, ultimately supporting Danto’s theory of tlie “End of Art” 
In this sense, it is appropriate to indicate the differences between the objects with etlmo-cultural 
referents in use since Pop Art until today’s installations, and those of Duchamp which pose, through 
deliberation, tlie ontological questions regarding the artwork.
their titles. His play on words, or more appropriately, verbal puns are the most
extensive among the artists of this century.^’
To support this, de Duve labels Duchamp’s passage from painting to the
readymade as “Pictorial Nominalism”, that is a kind of naming of the visual. Carol
James, after referring to the concepts o f ‘literal’ and ‘pictorial’ nominalism in Marcel
Duchamp’s own notes, explains the function of the readymade with rhetorical terms:
As part o f the perennial pair describing verbal messages, “the literal and the 
figurative,” the literal is the half valued for immediate clarity and devalued for 
lack o f depth or eloquence. This rhetoric, with the implied visual metaphor o f  
layering, the estimation that there is a sense behind what one sees in art, is 
something Duchamp wanted to cut througli, and one method was the 
readymade. At a time when retinal painting o f hnpressionism. 
Postimpressionism and Cubism dominated and had redefined both taste and 
theory, Duchamp understood that art had other motivations and that he could 
work with this rhetoric and its irony in its verbal implications o f “literal,” both 
to bring art back into the mental and to redirect the visual beyond aesthetics. 
(1991: 280)
Apparently, the readymade, with its ‘literal’ content simultaneously cancel 
representation while posing questions on the ontological grounds of art. The issue of 
nominalism, thus, refer back to the title of this writing, that is, a contextualization. 
When photography is concerned, this contextualization (or the ‘naming’ of the 
photograph as art) have similarities with the rest of the objects in art context: “We see 
that the truth-function of art does not consist of bringing a truth or a content of 
knowledge to the point of its thematization; but, quite differently, that it brings itself 
to the point o f a nomination, where that which it names is nothing other than its 
naming function.” (de Duve, 1991: 61) However, this is not to say that 
epistemologically the photograph works on the same plane as any man-made, 
mass-produced object, even when both are culturally loaded. The traits previously 
handled in this writing that inevitably tie the photograph to other forms of
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y) Sec The Writings of Marcel Duchamp.
representational images, also set it apart from the rest of the objects. But nevertheless, 
the direct link that connects the photograph and its object is in a unique nature 
compared to traditional images, which renders possible a kind of substitution of the 
object with its photograph, no matter how ‘artful’ the photographic image is. If 
nominating an object as a work of art is a kind of abstract thought, as mentioned 
earlier, then it seems plausible that the same object can be replaced with its 
photographic image within another kind o f ‘abstraction’.
The second account of the readymade that closely calls for the production of
photographs involves an ‘experience of seriality’ as Rosalind Krauss states:
...the possibility.... which plays a large role in the history o f the reception of  
Duchamp’s readymades , is the experience o f seriality, and the position o f the 
series within the discourse o f modernism. The urinal factors into this discourse 
the issue o f the replica, the mold, the cast, which is to say, the multiple without 
the original. (1991: 179)
By this way, the photograph is once more integrated in the industrial culture 
that it was born into, just as the readymade. The ability of the photographic image to 
be multiplied from a negative (the mold) becomes the integral part of the way it is 
perceived. However when the special conditions of this culture is concerned, especially 
in the first three decades of the twentieth century that also coincide with the 
emergence of the readymade, it becomes necessary to separate the standardized object 
in art context from the functionalist aesthetics. De Duve investigates the relevant 
tendencies of the time through Arts and Crafts movement, architecture and the 
Bauhaus, and finds major differences between the way functionalism operates and that 
of the readymade. To him, the functionalist object retained everything related to art, 
‘the talent, the work, the ambition’, except the name ‘art’. That is, “a work of art to 
which one denies this name in order to use it as a utensil.” And the flip side o f this 
denial is the success of the readymade:
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The readymade reveals precisely what fiinctionalism denied, the function of 
the name. Duchamp chooses an industrial product, displaces it, puts it to 
another purpose, whereby it looses all its utilitarian value, as well as all 
ergonomic adjustment o f its form to its function, but, by the same token, gains
a function as pure Symbol......However, since the readymade belongs to
industry, it declares its belonging; it is the s)miboI o f this belonging, the 
recording sign o f industrial culture. (1991; 115)
Apparently, the possibility of any photographic image to be named as art and 
be seen in a totally different context than that of its initial function bears resemblance 
with the above. Not exactly the utensil as the mass produced object, but nevertheless 
multiplied to perform a function, the photograph can be seen for something other than 
what it shows, or as the symbol of the very function that it is intended for.
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5. Conclusion: Art and Photography in the Post-Photographic Time
Since its beginning, this research has put forth a dilemma that came out of two
interacting but polar conceptions of the field regarding art and photography. The
former involves a kind of experiment in which the photographic image is put into a test
where parameters of representation (such as mimesis, perspective and abstraction)
provided the necessary condition for the photograph’s status as art. This is closer to
what Walter Benjamin calls “photography as art”, to him an injustice to
photography’s mission and a misconception bound to fail from the start:
It is indeed significant that the debate has raged most fiercely around the 
aesthetics o f photography as art, whereas the far less questionable social 
fact o f art as photography was given scarcely a glance. And yet the impact of 
the photographic reproduction o f art works is o f very much greater 
importance for the function o f art than the greater or lesser artistry o f a 
photography that regards all experience as fair game for the camera.
(1979: 253)
However, this experiment should be valued for one reason: although 
particularly interested in specific problems of representation, this is an investigation 
into the ‘nature’ of the artwork (if such a term is still valid), a kind of survey that 
always goes through the photograph to reach a broader understanding of art. 
Considering any kind of commitment in artistic practice and possibilities of a 
continuing production of artworks by using photographs, this research could never 
have taken another theme central to it: In the end, there is only one reality, that is, of 
art’s.
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The latter conception, which is bound to a wide range of cultural phenomena 
and ideology shaped by technology, reigns over the singular photograph, generalizes it 
and attempts to redefine art from the other way around, that is, in regard to the 
reconfigured observer. Indeed, Benjamin is the first to see this shift in perception due 
to technology, not only of imaging but of modes of production in general. When art is 
concerned, Benjamin’s transformed observer becomes the masses, either in front of the 
cinema screen or with photographically reproduced artwork in their hands, or, 
experiencing architecture in a collective mode of perception long before the technical 
images. His insight provides the starting point for many of the arguments in this 
research and moreover, it does render traditional art media like painting as somewhat 
underprivileged in comparison especially with film, pathetically attached to its aura as 
an authentic artwork, demanding intense concentration from its audience in the 
distracted-fragmented time and space o f the modern times. But however, this 
conception falls somewhat short in guiding the maker of the artwork, or better, by 
supposing a kind of democratization through photography, it apparently becomes 
another modernist utopia in the way of bringing art and life together.
Most of the significant commentary on photography that are referred to in this 
study, starting with Walter Benjamin and continued by Barthes, Berger and Sontag, 
nevertheless belong to an era of understanding in which the primary importance had 
been given to the ‘truth’ in the photographs. Or, in Roland Barthes’ words, the 
‘noeme’ of the photograph (that is, that has been) as its primary feature that 
authenticates the existence of the subject being photographed, also implies that any 
photograph is a thing of the past, belonging to a specific place and time. This set the 
photographic image apart from other forms of representation, verbal or pictorial. It is 
certainly not quite right to claim that this body of commentary -which ranges between
1931 and early 1980’s- is totally superseded by the shifting paradigms in receiving, 
understanding, and as some call it, decoding of the photographic image. If there is an 
‘essence’ of photography as we know it, it still lies in the processes, optical and 
chemical, that were introduced in 1839. But on the other hand, the shift in paradigms 
that are introduced primarily by digitization of the photographic image calls for a new 
commentary.
In this sense, one can claim that the avant-garde in art always presupposed an 
ability to project into future, or more precisely to point out a demand that can only be 
fulfilled in future. Within this vein, the major interest of the historical avant-garde of 
the early twentieth century was to foresee an appropriate artform, in order to bring 
closer art and life o f the times to come, as another variant of the issue of high art and 
popular culture. Inside the modern Zeitgeist, this future was mostly thought to be 
shaped by technology; whether it was the assembly line, mass production, automation, 
or computers (as now), the artistic advances always responded to what was 
considered to shape mankind’s fliture physically and mentally. While the material base 
o f the artwork (on the very physical level) continue to change, the issues of 
representation still persist as a philosophical-epistemic issue, even when they evolve 
into a new mode, interacting with the very nature o f the ‘material base’ o f the 
artwork that new technologies offer. In other words, there appears to be a necessity to 
reconsider the parameters of representation in the light of new technologies. In fact 
photography did pose a similar problem with its introduction more than 150 years ago, 
as opposed to traditional images and all aesthetic theories related with them. When 
early avant-garde art o f twentieth century is concerned, the scientific breakthroughs, 
namely non-Euclidian geometry, atomic theory and Theory of Relativity, had
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tremendous impact on issues of representation, leading to revolutionary forms of art 
as Timothy Druckrey observes;
In many ways, the entire twentieth century has been spent grappling with the 
rupture of continuity initiated in its first decade. From physics to the 
development of gene .splicing, the logic of totalizing narratives has been 
eroding. As pertinent in the arts as they are in physics, biology, and politics, 
tlie themes represented by fragmentation and rupture permeate our 
contemporary theories of identity, race, language, and dreaming, which are 
splintered into bits with meanings that are neither linear nor singular.
(1994: 4-5)
To incorporate this with the photographic representation of the objective 
world, one should note how photography had long been instrumental before the 
rupture was initiated, how it was born into a positivistic culture, as Virilio observes: 
“Photography, in fulfilment of Descartes' hopes, had been largely an art in which 
the ‘mind’ dominating the machine interpreted the results in the fine tradition of 
instrumental reason.” (1994: 22) But in 20th Century, it becomes evident that 
photography exhausted the possibilities of its instrumentality ‘by multiplying proofs of 
reality’, hence the long posed problem that it became possible to take it for granted 
without interpreting its products. For Virilio, this marks the decline of the faith in the 
‘objective world’;
.... because the technical progress of photography brought daily proof of its 
advance, it became gradually more and more impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that, since every object is for us merely the sum of the qualities we 
attribute to it, the sum of information we derive from it at any given moment, 
the objective world could only exist as what we represent it to be and as a 
more or less enduring mental construct.
Einstein took this reasoning to its logical conclusion by showing that 
space and time are forms o f intuition that are now as much a part of our 
consciousness as concepts like form, color, size and so on. Einstein's theory 
did not contradict classical physics. It simply revealed its limits which were 
those of any science linked to man's sensory experience, to the general sense of 
spatial relationships which the logistics of perception have been secretly 
undercutting since the Renaissance and especially since the nineteenth 
century..." (1994: 22)
To follow the argument into recent times, and to emphasize how the new 
epistemology is being detached from ‘vision’ as it relates to the ‘objective world’, one 
should look into the new scientific-technological media o f arts. More and more, as the 
new terminology of digital realm including digital photography, virtual reality, 
cyberspace, artificial intelligence, computer modeling and others gain prominence, a 
new formulation of the relations between technology, representation, reality and art 
becomes important:
How, then, can the recent development o f electronic imaging be contextualized 
in the recent history o f art? The answer does not exist as a simple shift in the 
structure o f image formation and processing, but in a larger historical shift 
that, on the one hand, aligns the production o f signs with teclinology and, on 
the other, links teclmology with communication and discourse.
(Druckrey, 1994: 5)
Not so surprisingly, in almost all references to the epistemology shaped by 
digital media, including ones by Paul Virilio, Timothy Druckrey, Kevin Robins, and 
William Mitchell, the basis of any new argument takes the photographic image as a 
cardinal point. Apparently, several reasons account for this comparison of the digitized 
image with the photograph. The first involves the ‘test of reality’ long established by 
the photograph (as argued earlier) as compared to the aspects of reality represented by 
the computer images. In representational terms as regards the arts, and as an ethical 
issue, the synthesized digital image is always compared to the photograph in the ways 
through which a kind of reality is conveyed. These include many of the parameters and 
concepts already handled in this research, including the significance of perspective, the 
analytical and synthetic, and even the concept of readymade. Indeed, the second 
reason forms a kind of technically comprehensible basis for the first one: that is, the 
apparent likeness of ‘image capturing devices’ used by digital media to the 
optical-chemical processes of photographic camera. The third reason to follow
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involves the two separate but comparable informational means that form the 
foundations of photographic and digital images, one supplying an analog (continuous) 
representation and the other, a digital (discrete) one. Another reason why the 
photographic image forms the parameter for understanding the nature o f ‘computer 
art’ is closely related to the processes of montage in art, as it also explains, to a certain 
degree, the synthesized ‘computer collage.’
The first step to understand the transition from classical technology of 
photography into the digitized image, and the blurred line in between the two in terms 
of representation, is to realize the distinctions in image formation. Among the issues 
referred to above, the photograph as an analog representation of space in a scene, that 
‘varies continuously, both spatially and tonally’ differs substantially from digital 
images, as Mitchell observes:
....images are encoded digitally by uniformly subdividing the picture plane into 
a finite Cartesian grid of cells and specifying the intensity or color of each cell 
by means of an integer number drawn from some limited range... In such 
images, unlike photographs, fine details and smooth curves are approximated 
to the grid, and continuous tonal gradients are broken up into discrete steps. 
(1992; 5)
From this, several conclusions follow: The first is the fact that a photograph 
contains an indefinite amount of information, while a digital image has a fixed amount, 
that is, when enlarged it does not yield more information. The second and more 
important conclusion is related with the ability to be reproduced and to be transferred 
to other surfaces. Unlike analog images which cannot be copied without a loss of 
quality (i.e. a photograph of an original work, or a photograph of a photograph with a 
second generation negative) the digital image can be reproduced and electronically 
transferred without any loss: “A digital copy is not a debased descendant but is 
absolutely indistinguishable from the original.” (Mitchell, 1992; 6) Obviously, this
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radically alters the reception of artworks both physically, as the images are 
transported long distances without a loss, and also mentally as they become ephemeral 
entities circulating in a virtual space. A step further from the transformation that 
Benjamin foresaw with the photographic reproduction of artworks, this second 
transformation initiates a new understanding of exliibition, originality, authorship, 
distribution, reception and exchange value of artworks. Nevertheless, whether digital 
images formed (partially or fully) through photographic means (a lens and a sensitive 
surface) can transform the parameters of artistic representation laid out in this 
research, still remains to be solved.
In these terms, some of the views presented in this research point to the 
transparency of the photographic medium, its relation to reality of appearances and the 
ways that it shaped the observer as such. Indeed, photographs ‘visualize’ in analogy, 
that is in analogy to the optics of human perception. As long as the image capturing 
devices used for digital media work in similar vein, with this kind of an analogy, a 
reconciliation with the classical apparatus of photography becomes possible. As 
photographs, first rendered through a lens on light sensitive surface, then digitized 
(scanned), or the images that are captured with still video cameras (or by frame 
grabbers from video) used in synthesizing the digital images, there is a possibility for a 
new extension of the photographic parameters of representation. However, as 
photographs are increasingly combined with other digital technologies of image 
formation, the ambiguities follow in regard to the truth content of the new image. And 
this ultimately effects our conception of representational issues in photography and 
how it is contextualized as art. Mitchell calls this a ‘shift from two dimensional image 
capture to three-dimensional model capture’:
The principle o f sweeping a probe across a surface or through a volume 
underlies an extensive array o f image-capture devices that employ a range of 
physical principles.... Although Landsat images, MRJ (Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging) scans, scanning tumieling microscope images, and the like look as if  
they were made with a camera, the process is entirely nonphotographic and the 
‘exposures’ are usually far from instantaneous. In fact, these sorts o f pictures 
result from the application o f scientific method in an idealized form; 
observations are used to constnict a digital model, which is then employed in 
conjunction with formalized tlieory to produce predictions o f what would be 
seen under certain viewing conditions. (1992: 64)
In fact the problem arises when photographs are more and more incorporated, 
blended, manipulated, contextualized, and compared with these ‘constaicted’ images, 
altering the very basis of the photographic image grounded on optical reality.“  As 
Mitchell suggests: “In these cases, the traditional distinction between image capture 
and image construction begins to break down, and perplexing questions arise. Is what 
we see ‘real’ or is it a ‘simulation’?” (1992; 66) Once a digital model is constructed, 
the deconstruction of photographic objectivity as it relates to ‘time’ and ‘space’, is 
complete. In this case, the ‘virtual space’ works on the very same principles of 
photographic perspective, simulating the photograph by ‘taking’ the photographs of 
the virtual model. The computer algorithms for constructing the perspective developed 
in 1960’s are considered to be as important as the rules laid out by Brunelleschi and 
Alberti, supplying a representation of space without sight, from a virtual viewpoint, 
that can be ‘often indistinguishable from high-quality color photographs.’ The all 
important actuality of the photograph and the presence of the photographer choosing a 
viewpoint is transferred to the virtuality of the machine and the computed perspective. 
Meanwhile, the ‘delayed-time presence’ of the photograph is turned into the ‘real-time
presence’ of the computer image, mutating the fundamental trait of the photographic
Paul Virilio calls this phenomenon a ‘fusion/confusion’, a term he frequently employs tlu-ough Iris 
writings: “To my mind, this is one of the most crucial aspects of the development of the new 
tecluiologies of digital imagery and of the synthetic vision offered by electron optics: the relative 
fusion/confusion of tire factual (or operational, if you prefer) and the virtual; the ascendancy of the 
'reality effect’ over a reality principle already largely contested elsewhere, particularly in physics.” 
(1994:'60)
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image that was strongly emphasized through Sontag’s writings in this research. As 
Paul Virilio observes:
...paradoxical logic emerges when the real-time image dominates the tiring 
represented, real time subsequently prevailing over real space, virtuality 
dominating actuality and turning the very concept o f reality on its head. 
Whence the crisis in traditional forms o f public representation (grapliies, 
photography, cinema...), to the great advantage o f presentation, o f  a 
paradoxical presence, the long-distance telepresenee o f the object or being 
which provides their very existence, here and now. (1994; 63)
Through these, the other fundamental characteristic of the photographic image, 
paraphrased by Roland Barthes as “the referent adheres” , is either cancelled or it 
gives way to a multitude of cases where a variant of the paradoxical logic prevailed, 
for example, as photographs (and video) are simultaneously accepted and refused as 
legal evidence. In fact the effect of these properties of the digital image for the arts 
are complex enough not to fit in the limited parameters of representation that for a 
long time fed the theories of art.
As stated in the introduction, this study attempts to separate the issues of 
visual representation from those of the broader category regarding politics and 
ideology, just as they are also attached to mass media including the print, television 
and now incorporating the computers. But without an exception, all accounts of the 
computer as a possible art medium, “..a universal machine, a metamedium that will 
contain and become all media.” (Youngblood, 1989: 10) refer once more to the 
politics of representation. The major reason for this indeed lies in the fact that the 
computer imaging technology is initially developed for, and its short history is marked 
mostly by rnilitary purposes of surveillance, deterrence, creating decoys, simulating 
war machines, and that this technology is increasingly infiltrating the civilian life for 
the similar purposes of surveillance, control and maintaining power. In The Vision 
Machine. Paul Virilio writes extensively on the electronic technologies of war and its
counterpart in surveillance, as the new machine enables the ‘automation of perception’
( vision without sight) and he refers all the way back to the first street lamps in Paris 
and London in retrospect, to mark the beginnings o f surveillance.
In turn, by a postmodern terminology to include ‘simulation’ and ‘simulacra’,
the computer realigns the problematics of art in reference to mass media, and extends
the territory o f this term to include the simulated computer image or the digital
photograph. When art is concerned, this alignment poses an important problem,
namely a ‘techno-fetishism’, as observed by Kevin Robins:
The question o f technology... is not at all a technological question. What seem 
to me o f the utmost importance are the social and cultural forces that are 
stimulating the development o f automatic aird cybernetic vision. The new 
image technologies have been shaped by, and are informed by, particular 
values o f western culture; they have been shaped by a logic o f rationality and 
control... In this light, we may be less impressed about the 
techno-revolutionary claims being made about the transition from chemical 
photography to electronic imaging, hi refusing to fetishize the teclinologies, we
are......more able to recognize and acknowledge the continuities and
transformations o f particular dynamics in western culture. (1991: 55-56)‘"
With this emphasis on a continuation, and a warning of a possible fetishism, 
Robins criticizes the new utopia of our times: the machine to universalize imagination 
and culture. In this realm of technology, the utopia becomes a kind of 
democratization, replacing the industrial notion o f ‘distribution’ (i.e. of photography) 
with the new one o f ‘networking’, and thus handing the control of power to masses. 
Indeed one would expect this to transform the entire domain of artistic activity, to
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It is very important to note tliat an understanding of a continuity in this sense is indispensible both for 
history and tlieory of art. A sound example can be given from Pictorial Nominalism that, even in the 
case of a disruption like the readymade, Thierry de Duve finally resumes with the affinnation of a 
continuity: ".. From this came... my desire to demonstrate that the readymade, far from being a 
gratuitous and accessory fantasy in the art of Duchamp, was his principal contribution to contemporary' 
art, since above all else, it reinterpreted the past with such a pertinence that it endoved it with a new 
resonance. From tliis came the emphasis I put on the link witli tradition and on a "progressive" 
rehabilitation of this word. From tliis, finally, came the concentration on a point of personal passage in 
the life and work of Duchamp, because it signalled a point of transition where what remains at stake is 
one of the major cultural issues of what we have come to call, too quickly perhaps, our post-industrial 
society: is (he art of our time..."(1991: 188)
88
re-define it in regard to the new technology, something yet to be seen in full effect.
But in any case, apparently one should always keep in mind the previous cases where 
control and technology were aligned to include images/representations, as Robins 
comments;
In the nineteenth century, chemical photography was hailed as the first 
universal language. We can see more clearly now how tliose old photographic 
technologies reflected the vision and the values o f western culture. In the name 
o f universalism, they were mobilized against, and mtmded into, other cultures. 
It is difficult to believe that it could be otherwise with the new digital 
electronic teclmologies.... The West ‘can only be a name for a subject wliich 
gathers itself in a discourse,’ one that ‘continually seeks itself in the midst of 
interaction with the Otlrer’. In so doing, the West strives to ‘represent tire 
moment’ o f the universal... (1991; 75)
To state it once more, this study attempted to separate itself from the politics 
of represenation to focus mainly on the particular issues of art that are deemed more 
essential, and less associated with such concepts as the ‘Other’ that signifies either the 
non-western world, or the minorities and women, or any cultural identity outside the 
mainstream - in short the Other as marking the ground of a struggle for freedom, 
power and control. When photography (as a means) is concerned, to maintain this 
separation is of an utmost hardship especially in retrospect, because its entire history is 
examplary of how the ‘Other’ is reconstituted to confirm ideologies and to sustain 
power, even when the photographic image is given the highest credit as truthful to 
nature. Moreover, within the specific geography (Türkiye) that this study is prepared 
and evaluated - in a culture itself a non-western ‘subject’ - to exclude such ideological 
references even appears to be a shortfall of a kind. But, by once again stressing the 
possibilities for the ‘disinterested’ character of art, and by giving the term ‘art’ (as a 
programme) the highest priviledge among all other representations that yield ways of 
knowing, and furthermore by replacing the ‘political reconstitution’ with a borrowed
phrase o f ‘transfiguration of the commonplace’ through which art-as-photography also 
operates, one can refer back to reconciliation of issues in this study.
The phrase is borrowed from Arthur Danto, an author informed in the field of 
philosophy which makes his writings extremely valuable for any discussion of art 
today. Unlike any other field of discourse, philosophies of art and their continuously 
changing states throughout history are expected to illuminate one of the rather unlit 
questions that repeatedly appeared in this research, that is, the ontological grounds of 
art. In turn, why aesthetics ‘as it was’ did not form one of the major parameters to 
analyse the photograph’s status as art will again be answered through Danto’s theory 
of ‘The End o f Art’. To him, this theory come to mean not the end of making 
artworks, but of its ‘history’:
....I began to believe, appropriating a famous thesis o f  H egel’s, that with the 
disclosure or discovery o f its tme philosophical nature, art attains the end of 
its history....The thought that art is something which reaches a sort o f  
historical end, beyond which it turns into something else -beyond which it in 
fact turns mto philosophy- was proposed by Hegel in his lectures on the 
philosophy o f art in Berlin in 1828. This implies a veiy different master 
narrative for art than that which, enunciated by Vasari, had governed the 
production and appreciation o f art in the West until late in the nineteenth 
century. Vasari also believed art comes to an end, in the sense that its defining 
problems get solved, after wliich there is nothing left to do but apply the 
solutions to the various tasks artists are called upon to do. (1992; 7-8)
With this, as mentioned in the very begimiing, Danto calls our time ‘the 
post-historical period of art’, to him a complete liberation that relieves the artist from 
the burden o f the history of art, or better, of being historically correct. And in 
connection, the transfiguration of the commonplace comes to mean that art exists as 
its own philosophy, or rather, the difference between an object o f art and a ‘mere real 
thing’ have to be non-perceptual. Danto admits this to be an achievement not of 
Duchamp and the readymade, but particularly of Andy Warhol and his ‘Brillo Box’:
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What Warhol’s dictum amounted to was that you cannot tell when something 
is a work o f art just by looking at it, for there is no particular way art has to 
look. The upshot was that you could not teach the meaning o f art by 
examples.... The eye, so prized an aesthetic organ when it was felt that the 
difference between art and non-art was visible, was philosophically o f no use 
whatever when the differences proved instead to be invisible. (1992: 5)
Just as it is the case, with an obvious simile, it becomes possible to conclude 
that the photograph works the same way in art context, that there may be no way of 
telling whether it is art just by looking at it, and that it is ‘contextualized’ as art. In 
these terms, one can say that photography is a means used within the broader 
programme of art, and that this status of photography does not indicate a kind of 
negative judgement of value. On the contrary, with all its characteristics and potential 
that are referred to in this study, and moreover with its controversial (and subversive) 
role in the digital realm, the photograph continues to be the most influential form of 
image in artistic practice today, provided that it can detach itself from redundant 
parameters of art.
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